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About

About

José Villar was born in 1967 in Madrid. He received the degree in Electronic Engineering in 1991 and his Ph.D in 1997 from the School of Industrial Engineering-ICAI at the Universidad Pontificia Comillas, Madrid, Spain. From 1997 to 2017 he was Researcher at the Instituto de Investigación Tecnológica-IIT (Institute for Research in Technology) of ICAI and Deputy Director of IIT from 2004 to 2016, and was Senior Associate Professor at the ICAI Electronic and Communications Department, and member of the Doctorate Academic Comission of Comillas University from 2013 to 2017.

José Villar is currently Senior Researcher at INESC TEC in its Center for Power and Energy Systems.

He has participated in more than 50 research projects with industry and administrations, coordinating more than 20, and his co-author of more than 20 papers in International Journals (most JCR indexed) and more than 60 papers in international conferences.

His current areas of interest include operation and strategic planning of power systems, electrical vehicles, renewable generation, distributed generation and smart cities, soft computing and data mining.

Interest
Topics
Details

Details

018
Publications

2023

Pricing and Simulating Energy Transactions in Energy Communities

Authors
Mello, J; de Lorenzo, C; Campos, FA; Villar, J;

Publication
ENERGIES

Abstract
Extensive literature is available for modeling and simulating local electricity markets, often called P2P electricity markets, and for pricing local energy transactions in energy communities. Market models and pricing mechanisms provide simulation tools to better understand how these new markets behave, helping to design their main rules for real applications, and assessing the financial compensations of the internal energy transactions. As such, pricing mechanisms are often needed in energy management systems when centralized management approaches are preferred to market-based ones. First, this paper highlights the links between local electricity markets, pricing mechanisms for local electricity transactions, and other approaches to sharing the collective benefits of participating in transactive energy communities. Then, a standard nomenclature is defined to review some of the main pricing mechanisms for local energy transactions, an innovative pricing mechanism based on the economic principles of a post-delivery pool market is proposed, and other relevant approaches for local electricity market simulation such as Nash equilibrium or agent-based simulation are also revisited. The revision was based on systematic searches in common research databases and on the authors’ experience in European and national projects, including local industrial applications for the past five years. A qualitative assessment of the reviewed methods is also provided, and the research challenges are highlighted. This review is intended to serve as a practical guide to pricing mechanisms and market simulation procedures for practical designs of internal financial compensation to share the collective benefits of energy communities. © 2023 by the authors.

2023

5. Coordenação com o sistema energético

Authors
Villar, J; Mello, J; Lopes, JP;

Publication
Comunidades de Energia Renovável

Abstract

2023

A Three-Stage Model to Manage Energy Communities, Share Benefits and Provide Local Grid Services

Authors
Rocha, R; Silva, R; Mello, J; Faria, S; Retorta, F; Gouveia, C; Villar, J;

Publication
ENERGIES

Abstract
This paper proposes a three-stage model for managing energy communities for local energy sharing and providing grid flexibility services to tackle local distribution grid constraints. The first stage addresses the minimization of each prosumer’s individual energy bill by optimizing the schedules of their flexible resources. The second stage optimizes the energy bill of the whole energy community by sharing the prosumers’ energy surplus internally and re-dispatching their batteries, while guaranteeing that each prosumer’s new energy bill is always be equal to or less than the bill that results for this prosumer from stage one. This collective optimization is designed to ensure an additional collective benefit, without loss for any community member. The third stage, which can be performed by the distribution system operator (DSO), aims to solve the local grid constraints by re-dispatching the flexible resources and, if still necessary, by curtailing local generation or consumption. Stage three minimizes the impact on the schedule obtained at previous stages by minimizing the loss of profit or utility for all prosumers, which are furthermore financially compensated accordingly. This paper describes how the settlement should be performed, including the allocation coefficients to be sent to the DSO to determine the self-consumed and supplied energies of each peer. Finally, some case studies allow an assessment of the performance of the proposed methodology. Results show, among other things, the potential benefits of allowing the allocation coefficients to take negative values to increase the retail market competition; the importance of stage one or, alternatively, the need for a fair internal price to avoid unfair collective benefit sharing among the community members; or how stage three can effectively contribute to grid constraint solving, profiting first from the existing flexible resources.

2022

Conciliating the Settlement of Local Energy Markets with Self-Consumption Regulations

Authors
Mello, J; Villar, J; Saraiva, J;

Publication
SSRN Electronic Journal

Abstract

2022

Hybridization of CEVESA MIBEL market model based on market outcomes

Authors
Oliveira A.R.D.; Navega V.; Collado J.V.; Saraiva J.T.; Campos F.A.;

Publication
International Conference on the European Energy Market, EEM

Abstract
Fundamental electricity market models tend to underestimate the real market prices because they do not properly represent the real variable production cost of the generation units, nor the strategic markup that generation companies add to their costs to price the offered energy. This markup can increase bid prices above the marginal cost of the generation units, which may leave bids out of the market, decreasing the total cleared production, but increasing the final market price. This paper proposes a simple procedure, based on the real market outcomes, to estimate these markups and improve CEVESA MIBEL market model by reducing the gap between the simulated and the real market prices.

Supervised
thesis

2018

Profitability Analysis of CCTGs under Future Scenarios of High Res and EV Penetration

Author
Francisco Martínez Rubio

Institution

2018

Ramp Analysis of the Net Load Under Different Penetration Scenarios

Author
Jorge Dias de Magalhães

Institution
UP-FEUP

2017

Energy management in smart cities

Author
Christian Francisco Calvillo Muñoz

Institution
Outra

2017

Modeling policymaker’s decisions in a power sector: a state-of-the-art review

Author
Salvador Doménech Martínez

Institution

2017

Análisis de recuperación de costes variables bajo penetración combinada de vehículo eléctrico y generación renovable

Author
Gonzalo Sánchez Contreras

Institution