Abstract
In this paper, we consider a Stackelberg duopoly competition with differentiated goods and with unknown costs. The firms' aim is to choose the output levels of their products according to the well-known concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium. There is a firm (F(1)) that chooses first the quantity q(1) of its good; the other firm (F(2)) observes q(1) and then chooses the quantity g(2) of its good. We suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them following a probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that there is exactly one perfect Bayesian equilibrium for this game. We analyse the advantages, for firms and for consumers, of using the technology with the highest production cost versus the one with the cheapest cost.

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In this work, we consider a classic international trade model with two countries and one firm in each country. The game has two stages: in the first stage, the governments of each country use their welfare functions to choose their tariffs either: (a) competitively (Nash equilibrium) or (b) cooperatively (social optimum); in the second stage, firms competitively choose (Nash) their home and export quantities under Cournot-type competition conditions. In a previous publication we compared the competitive tariffs with the cooperative tariffs and we showed that the game is one of the two following types: (i) prisoner's dilemma (when the competitive welfare outcome is dominated by the cooperative welfare outcome); or (ii) a lose-win dilemma (an asymmetric situation where only one of the countries is damaged in the cooperative welfare outcome, whereas the other is benefited). In both scenarios, their aggregate cooperative welfare is larger than the aggregate competitive welfare. The lack of coincidence of competitive and cooperative tariffs is one of the main difficulties in international trade calling for the establishment of trade agreements. In this work, we propose a welfare-balanced trade agreement where: (i) the countries implement their cooperative tariffs and so increase their aggregate welfare from the competitive to the cooperative outcome; (ii) they redistribute the aggregate cooperative welfare according to their relative competitive welfare shares. We analyse the impact of such trade agreement in the relative shares of relevant economic quantities such as the firm's profits, consumer surplus, and custom revenue. This analysis allows the countries to add other conditions to the agreement to mitigate the effects of high changes in these relative shares. Finally, we introduce the trade agreement index measuring the gains in the aggregate welfare of the two countries. In general, we observe that when the gains are higher, the relative shares also exhibit higher changes. Hence, higher gains demand additional caution in the construction of the trade agreement to safeguard the interests of the countries.

Abstract
We study the optimal consumption, investment and life-insurance purchase and selection strategies for a wage-earner with an uncertain lifetime with access to a financial market comprised of one risk-free security and one risky-asset whose prices evolve according to linear diffusions modulated by a continuous-time stochastic process determined by an additional diffusive nonlinear stochastic differential equation. The process modulating the linear diffusions may be regarded as an indicator describing the state of the economy in a given instant of time. Additionally, we allow the Brownian motions driving each of these equations to be correlated. The life-insurance market under consideration herein consists of a fixed number of providers offering pairwise distinct contracts. We use dynamic programming techniques to characterize the solutions to the problem described above for a general family of utility functions, studying the case of discounted constant relative risk aversion utilities with more detail.