Abstract
The theory of planned behaviour studies the decision-making mechanisms of individuals. We propose the Bayesian-Nash equilibria as one, of many, possible mechanisms of transforming human intentions in behaviour. This process corresponds to the best strategic individual decision taking in account the collective response. We show that saturation, boredom and frustration can lead to splitted strategies, in opposition to no saturation that leads to a constant strategy.

Abstract
We study the problem of determination of asset prices in an incomplete market proposing three different but related scenarios. One scenario uses a market game approach whereas the other two are based on risk sharing or regret minimizing considerations. Dynamical schemes modelling the convergence of the buyer's and of the seller's prices to a unique price are proposed.

Abstract
We present a new R&D investment function in a Cournot competition model inspired in the logistic equation. We do a full characterization of the associated game and study the short- and long-term economical effects derived from using this new R&D investment function. In particular, we find the existence of regions with multiple Nash investment equilibria. For low production costs, that can correspond to the production of old technologies, the long-term economical effects are not very sensitive to small changes in the efficiency of the R&D programmes neither to small changes in the market structure. However, for high production costs, that can correspond to the production of new technologies, the long-term economical effects are very sensitive to small changes in the efficiency of the R&D programmes and also to small changes in the market structure.

Abstract
We prove a one-to-one correspondence between C1+ conjugacy classes of diffeomorphisms with hyperbolic sets contained in surfaces and stable and unstable pairs of one-dimensional C1+ self-renormalizable structures.

Abstract
We use d'Aspremont and Jacquemin's strategic optimal R&D investment in a duopoly Cournot competition model to construct myopic optimal discrete and continuous R&D dynamics. We show that for some high initial production costs, the success or failure of a firm is very sensitive to small variations in its initial R&D investment strategies.

Abstract
We consider a Bertrand duopoly model with unknown costs. The firms' aim is to choose the price of its product according to the well-known concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The chooses are made simultaneously by both firms. In this paper, we suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them according to a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that this game has exactly one Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We analyse the advantages, for firms and for consumers, of using the technology with highest production cost versus the one with cheapest production cost. We prove that the expected profit of each firm increases with the variance of its production costs. We also show that the expected price of each good increases with both expected production costs, being the effect of the expected production costs of the rival dominated by the effect of the own expected production costs.