Abstract
This article delves into the role of the quantum Fisher information matrix (FIM) in enhancing the performance of parameterized quantum circuit (PQC)-based reinforcement learning agents. While previous studies have highlighted the effectiveness of PQC-based policies preconditioned with the quantum FIM in contextual bandits, its impact in broader reinforcement learning contexts, such as Markov decision processes, is less clear. Through a detailed analysis of L & ouml;wner inequalities between quantum and classical FIMs, this study uncovers the nuanced distinctions and implications of using each type of FIM. Our results indicate that a PQC-based agent using the quantum FIM without additional insights typically incurs a larger approximation error and does not guarantee improved performance compared to the classical FIM. Empirical evaluations in classic control benchmarks suggest even though quantum FIM preconditioning outperforms standard gradient ascent, in general, it is not superior to classical FIM preconditioning.

Abstract
In the past three decades, an impressive body of knowledge has been built around secure and private password authentication. In particular, secure password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocols require only minimal overhead over a classical Diffie-Hellman key exchange. PAKEs are also known to fulfill strong composable security guarantees that capture many password-specific concerns such as password correlations or password mistyping, to name only a few. However, to enjoy both round-optimality and strong security, applications of PAKE protocols must provide unique session and participant identifiers. If such identifiers are not readily available, they must be agreed upon at the cost of additional communication flows, a fact which has been met with incomprehension among practitioners, and which hindered the adoption of provably secure password authentication in practice. In this work, we resolve this issue by proposing a new paradigm for truly password-only yet securely composable PAKE, called bare PAKE. We formally prove that two prominent PAKE protocols, namely CPace and EKE, can be cast as bare PAKEs and hence do not require pre-agreement of anything else than a password. Our bare PAKE modeling further allows to investigate a novel reusability property of PAKEs, i.e., whether n(2) pairwise keys can be exchanged from only n messages, just as the Diffie-Hellman non-interactive key exchange can do in a public-key setting. As a side contribution, this add-on property of bare PAKEs leads us to observe that some previous PAKE constructions relied on unnecessarily strong, reusable building blocks. By showing that non-reusable tools suffice for standard PAKE, we open a new path towards round-optimal post-quantum secure password-authenticated key exchange.

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