Abstract
Current software development often relies on non-trivial coordination logic for combining autonomous services, eventually running on different platforms. As a rule, however, such a coordination layer is strongly woven within the application at source code level. Therefore, its precise identification becomes a major methodological (and technical) problem and a challenge to any program understanding or refactoring process. The approach introduced in this paper resorts to slicing techniques to extract coordination data from source code. Such data are captured in a specific dependency graph structure from which a coordination model can be recovered either in the form of an ORC specification or as a collection of code fragments corresponding to the identification of typical coordination patterns in the system. Tool support is also discussed.

Abstract
Research in formal methods emphasizes a fundamental interconnection between modeling, calculation and prototyping, made possible by a common unambiguous, mathematical semantics. This paper, building on a broader research agenda on coalgebraic semantics for Unified Modeling Language diagrams, concentrates on class diagrams and discusses how such a coalgebraic perspective can be of use not only for formalizing their specification, but also as a basis for prototyping. © Springer-Verlag London Limited 2009.

Abstract

Abstract
Despite its huge success and increasing incorporation in complex, industrial-strength applications, open source software, by the very nature of its open, unconventional, distributed development model, is hard to assess and certify in an effective, sound and independent way. This makes its use and integration within safety or security-critical systems, a risk. And, simultaneously an opportunity and a challenge for rigourous, mathematically based, methods which aim at pushing software analysis and development to the level of a mature engineering discipline. This paper discusses such a challenge and proposes a number of ways in which open source development may benefit from the whole patrimony of formal methods.

Abstract
Completely non-malleable encryption schemes resist attacks which allow an adversary to tamper with both ciphertexts and public keys. In this paper we introduce two extractor-based properties that allow us to gain insight into the design of such schemes and to go beyond known feasibility results in this area. We formalise strong plaintext awareness and secret key awareness and prove their suitability in realising these goals. Strong plaintext awareness imposes that it is infeasible to construct a ciphertext under any public key without knowing the underlying message. Secret key awareness requires it to be infeasible to produce a new public key without knowing a corresponding secret key.

Abstract
We study relations among various notions of complete non-malleability, where an adversary can tamper with both ciphertexts and public-keys, and ciphertext indistinguishability. We follow the pattern of relations previously established for standard non-malleability. To this end, we propose a more convenient and conceptually simpler indistinguishability-based security model to analyse completely non-malleable schemes. Our model is based on strong decryption oracles, which provide decryptions under arbitrarily chosen public keys. We give the first precise definition of a strong decryption oracle, pointing out the subtleties in different approaches that can be taken. We construct the first efficient scheme, which is fully secure against strong chosen-ciphertext attacks, and therefore completely non-malleable, without random oracles.