2012
Authors
Guimaraes, CM; de Carvalho, JC;
Publication
International Journal of Engineering Business Management
Abstract
Looking for efficiency, quality and profitability gains, healthcare organizations are adopting outsourcing solutions in the attempt of "doing more with less". Seeking for cost reduction, risk mitigation, adapting to quick changes without compromising internal resources, these organizations also take big risks in control and flexibility variables. In order to understand how healthcare organizations find the best value equation combining internal and external resources in a modular service conception, a case study on a start-up Long-term Care unit with innovative format, great levels of customization and following an outsourcing strategy, was carried out. The main conclusion, among others, is that in ambitious start-ups, having speed of entrance as the conditioning factor, a process orientation and management approach may offer a clear view of the gains related with trade-off decisions regarding time and cost (agility) and cost and quality (Leanness) ie, decisions under the "leagile" paradigm. This study contributes for a wider understanding of the "leagile" concept associated to an outsourcing operational strategy. Additionally, it also provides new insights to the concept of modularity in services settings in a complex service as healthcare. © 2012 Guimarães and de Carvalho; licensee InTech.
2012
Authors
De Feo, G; Resende, J; Sanin, ME;
Publication
International Game Theory Review
Abstract
In this paper, we analyze environmental regulation based on tradable emission permits in the presence of strategic interaction in an output market with differentiated products. We characterize firms' equilibrium behavior in the permits and in the output market and we show that both firms adopt "rival's cost-rising strategies". Then, we study the problem of the regulator that aims at maximizing social welfare, proposing an efficient criterion to allocate permits between firms. We find that the optimal allocation criterion requires a perfect balance between the difference on firms' price-cost margins in the permits market and the difference on firms' mark ups in the output market. In light of the previous result, we use a simulation to obtain the optimal allocation of permits between firms as a function of output market characteristics, in particular as a function of goods substitutability. © 2012 World Scientific Publishing Company.
2012
Authors
Gabszewicz, JJ; Resende, J;
Publication
INFORMATION ECONOMICS AND POLICY
Abstract
This paper analyses price competition between two firms producing horizontally and vertically differentiated goods. These are assumed to be credence goods, as consumers can hardly ascertain the quality of the commodities. To illustrate the model, we adapt it to represent a newspaper industry with two outlets, when the population of readers have preferences both on the political stance of the newspapers and on the accuracy of the news they dispatch.
2011
Authors
Oliveira, MAY; Pinto Ferreira, JJP;
Publication
AFRICAN JOURNAL OF BUSINESS MANAGEMENT
Abstract
2011
Authors
Oliveira, MAY; Pinto Ferreira, JJP;
Publication
AFRICAN JOURNAL OF BUSINESS MANAGEMENT
Abstract
This is a conceptual paper supported by empirical research giving details of a new Business Narrative Modelling Language (BNML). The need for BNML arose given a growing dissatisfaction with qualitative research approaches and also due to the need to bring entrepreneurs, especially those with little training in management theory, closer to the academic (as well as practitioner) discussion of innovation and strategy for value creation. We aim primarily for an improved communication process of events which can be described using the narrative, in the discussion of the value creation process. Our findings, illustrated through a case study, should be of interest to both researchers and practitioners alike.
2011
Authors
Almeida, FLF; Rocha, RM;
Publication
Journal of Systems Integration
Abstract
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