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Publications by Vítor Parreira Pereira


A Fast and Verified Software Stack for Secure Function Evaluation

Almeida, JB; Barbosa, M; Barthe, G; Dupressoir, F; Gregoire, B; Laporte, V; Pereira, V;

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2017, Dallas, TX, USA, October 30 - November 03, 2017



Enforcing ideal-world leakage bounds in real-world secret sharing MPC frameworks

Almeida, JB; Barbosa, M; Barthe, G; Pacheco, H; Pereira, V; Portela, B;

Proceedings - IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium

We give a language-based security treatment of domain-specific languages and compilers for secure multi-party computation, a cryptographic paradigm that enables collaborative computation over encrypted data. Computations are specified in a core imperative language, as if they were intended to be executed by a trusted-third party, and formally verified against an information-flow policy modelling (an upper bound to) their leakage. This allows non-experts to assess the impact of performance-driven authorized disclosure of intermediate values. Specifications are then compiled to multi-party protocols. We formalize protocol security using (distributed) probabilistic information-flow and prove security-preserving compilation: Protocols only leak what is allowed by the source policy. The proof exploits a natural but previously missing correspondence between simulation-based cryptographic proofs and (composable) probabilistic non-interference. Finally, we extend our framework to justify leakage cancelling, a domain-specific optimization that allows to first write an efficient specification that fails to meet the allowed leakage upper-bound, and then apply a probabilistic pre-processing that brings leakage to the acceptable range. © 2018 IEEE.