Abstract
We consider an R&D investment function in a Cournot duopoly competitionmodel inspired in the logistic equation. We study the economical effects resulting from the firms having different R&D efficiencies. We present three cases: (1) both firms are efficient and have the same degree of efficiency; (2) both firms are less efficient and have the same degree of efficiency; (3) firms are asymmetric in terms of the efficiency of their R&D investment programs.We study the myopic dynamics on the production costs obtained from investing the Nash investment equilibria. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016.

Abstract

Abstract
In this work, we study the phenomena of dumping in a duopoly market through an infinitely repeated game. We consider two firms of different countries competing in the same country. When both firms are cooperating, if the foreign firm deviates from cooperation this can be interpreted as dumping and a period of punishment can be imposed to the foreign firm. After this, firms can play continuously the deviation-punishment game or compete à la Cournot. Previously, we observe that the repeated strategy of deviation-punishment is not adopted in the case of symmetric demand equations. Here, we observe that this strategy of repeated dumping can appear as the best repeated strategy when the demand equations are non-symmetric. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016.

Abstract
This book gathers carefully selected works in Mathematical Economics, on myriad topics including General Equilibrium, Game Theory, Economic Growth, Welfare, Social Choice Theory, Finance. It sheds light on the ongoing discussions that have brought together leading researchers from Latin America and Southern Europe at recent conferences in venues like Porto, Portugal; Athens, Greece; and Guanajuato, Mexico. With this volume, the editors not only contribute to the advancement of research in these areas, but also inspire other scholars around the globe to collaborate and research these vibrant, emerging topics.

Abstract

Abstract
We consider the problem faced by a wage-earner with an uncertain lifetime having to reach decisions concerning consumption and life-insurance purchase, while investing his savings in a financial market comprised of one risk-free security and an arbitrary number of risky securities whose prices are determined by diffusive linear stochastic differential equations. We assume that life-insurance is continuously available for the wage-earner to buy from a market composed of a fixed number of life insurance companies offering pairwise distinct life-insurance contracts. We characterize the optimal consumption, investment and life-insurance selection and purchase strategies for the wage-earner with an uncertain lifetime and whose goal is to maximize the expected utility obtained from his family consumption, from the size of the estate in the event of premature death, and from the size of the estate at the time of retirement. We use dynamic programming techniques to obtain an explicit solution in the case of discounted constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility functions.