Abstract
In this paper, we show how stream fusion, a program transformation technique used in functional programming, can be adapted for an Object-Oriented setting. This makes it possible to have more Stream operators than the ones currently provided by the Java Stream API. The addition of more operators allows for a greater deal of expressiveness. To this extent, we show how these operators are incorporated in the stream setting. Furthermore, we also demonstrate how a specific set of optimizations eliminates overheads and produces equivalent code in the form of for loops. In this way, programmers are relieved from the burden of writing code in such a cumbersome style, thus allowing for a more declarative and intuitive programming approach.

Abstract

Abstract

Abstract
Context-free languages are highly important in computer language processing technology as well as in formal language theory. The Pumping Lemma for Context-Free Languages states a property that is valid for all context-free languages, which makes it a tool for showing the existence of non-context-free languages. This paper presents a formalization, extending the previously formalized Lemma, of the fact that several well-known languages are not context-free. Moreover, we build on those results to construct a formal proof of the well-known property that context-free languages are not closed under intersection. All the formalization has been mechanized in the Coq proof assistant.

Abstract
We present a machine-checked proof of security for the domain management protocol of Amazon Web Services' KMS (Key Management Service) a critical security service used throughout AWS and by AWS customers. Domain management is at the core of AWS KMS; it governs the top-level keys that anchor the security of encryption services at AWS. We show that the protocol securely implements an ideal distributed encryption mechanism under standard cryptographic assumptions. The proof is machine-checked in the EasyCrypt proof assistant and is the largest EasyCrypt development to date.

Abstract
We present a high-assurance and high-speed implementation of the SHA-3 hash function. Our implementation is written in the Jasmin programming language, and is formally verified for functional correctness, provable security and timing attack resistance in the EasyCrypt proof assistant. Our implementation is the first to achieve simultaneously the four desirable properties (efficiency, correctness, provable security, and side-channel protection) for a non-trivial cryptographic primitive. Concretely, our mechanized proofs show that: 1) the SHA-3 hash function is indifferentiable from a random oracle, and thus is resistant against collision, first and second preimage attacks; 2) the SHA-3 hash function is correctly implemented by a vectorized x86 implementation. Furthermore, the implementation is provably protected against timing attacks in an idealized model of timing leaks. The proofs include new EasyCrypt libraries of independent interest for programmable random oracles and modular indifferentiability proofs.