Abstract
Within the development of motor vehicles, crash safety is one of the most important attributes. To comply with the ever increasing requirements of shorter cycle times and costs reduction, car manufacturers keep intensifying the use of virtual development tools, such as, for crash simulations, the explicit finite element method (FEM). The accuracy of the simulation process is highly dependent on the accuracy of the model, including the midplane mesh. One of the roughest approximations typically made is the actual part thickness which, although most frequently modelled as a constant value, can, in reality, vary locally. Availability of per element thickness information, which does not exist explicitly in the FEM model, is one key enabler and can significantly contribute to an improved crash simulation quality, especially regarding fracture prediction. Although not explicitly available, thickness can be inferred from the original CAD geometric model through geometric calculations. This paper proposes and compares two thickness estimation algorithms based on ray tracing and nearest neighbour 3D range searches. A systematic quantitative analysis of the accuracy of both algorithms is presented, as well as a thorough identification of particular geometric arrangements under which their accuracy can be compared. These results enable the identification of each technique's weaknesses and hint towards a new, integrated, approach to the problem that linearly combines the estimates produced by each algorithm.

Abstract

Abstract
Completely non-malleable encryption schemes resist attacks which allow an adversary to tamper with both ciphertexts and public keys. In this paper we introduce two extractor-based properties that allow us to gain insight into the design of such schemes and to go beyond known feasibility results in this area. We formalise strong plaintext awareness and secret key awareness and prove their suitability in realising these goals. Strong plaintext awareness imposes that it is infeasible to construct a ciphertext under any public key without knowing the underlying message. Secret key awareness requires it to be infeasible to produce a new public key without knowing a corresponding secret key.

Abstract
We study relations among various notions of complete non-malleability, where an adversary can tamper with both ciphertexts and public-keys, and ciphertext indistinguishability. We follow the pattern of relations previously established for standard non-malleability. To this end, we propose a more convenient and conceptually simpler indistinguishability-based security model to analyse completely non-malleable schemes. Our model is based on strong decryption oracles, which provide decryptions under arbitrarily chosen public keys. We give the first precise definition of a strong decryption oracle, pointing out the subtleties in different approaches that can be taken. We construct the first efficient scheme, which is fully secure against strong chosen-ciphertext attacks, and therefore completely non-malleable, without random oracles.

Abstract

Abstract