António Sérgio Faria

Abstract
This paper proposes a three-stage model for managing energy communities for local energy sharing and providing grid flexibility services to tackle local distribution grid constraints. The first stage addresses the minimization of each prosumer's individual energy bill by optimizing the schedules of their flexible resources. The second stage optimizes the energy bill of the whole energy community by sharing the prosumers' energy surplus internally and re-dispatching their batteries, while guaranteeing that each prosumer's new energy bill is always be equal to or less than the bill that results for this prosumer from stage one. This collective optimization is designed to ensure an additional collective benefit, without loss for any community member. The third stage, which can be performed by the distribution system operator (DSO), aims to solve the local grid constraints by re-dispatching the flexible resources and, if still necessary, by curtailing local generation or consumption. Stage three minimizes the impact on the schedule obtained at previous stages by minimizing the loss of profit or utility for all prosumers, which are furthermore financially compensated accordingly. This paper describes how the settlement should be performed, including the allocation coefficients to be sent to the DSO to determine the self-consumed and supplied energies of each peer. Finally, some case studies allow an assessment of the performance of the proposed methodology. Results show, among other things, the potential benefits of allowing the allocation coefficients to take negative values to increase the retail market competition; the importance of stage one or, alternatively, the need for a fair internal price to avoid unfair collective benefit sharing among the community members; or how stage three can effectively contribute to grid constraint solving, profiting first from the existing flexible resources.

Abstract
When the price of the energy shared within an energy community is based on a local energy market, it is the responsibility of each participant to bid adequately so that participating provides a larger benefit than not participating. Alternatively, centralized energy community bill minimization may be an option, but a mechanism to share the collective benefits among the members is needed. This mechanism should be fair and easy to explain, no members should be harmed with respect to their individual optimal behavior and should provide the right economic signal. This paper analyses and compares some common pricing mechanisms for the internal compensation for the energy shared among the members of an energy community centrally managed. Simple case examples are used to identify those pricing mechanisms that are fairer and provide the righter economic signals to the participants.

Abstract
This work aims to present a thorough study of a district heating scenario in a Greek industrial park case. The work is supported by the EMB3Rs open-source platform, allowing to perform a feasibility analysis of the system. In particular, this work explores the market module of this platform to provide a detailed market analysis of energy exchange within the Greek industrial park. The results pinpoint the effectiveness of the platform in simulating different market designs like centralized and decentralized, making clear the potential benefit the sources in the test case may achieve by engaging in a market framework. Different options for market clearing are considered in the study, for instance, including CO2 signals to reach carbon neutrality or community preferences to increase community autonomy. One can conclude that excess heat from existing sources is enough to cover other industries/facilities' heat demand, leading to environmental benefits as well as a fairer financial profits allocation.

Abstract
As prosumers and energy communities gain prominence in power systems, energy trading between prosumers in local P2P markets is paramount. Within this novel market design, peers can directly exchange energy with each other, leading to economic advantages while supporting the decarboniza-tion of the sector. To ensure that voltage and congestion issues are properly addressed, a thorough coordination between the P2P market and the Distribution System Operator is required. This paper presents and compares three mutual-benefit coordination methods. The first method entails applying product differentiation on an iterative basis to avoid exceeding the lines thermal limits, which is performed through penalties on P2P exchanges that may be overloading the network. The second method uses the P2P market with an AC-OPF, ensuring network operation through a flexibility market via upward and downward flexibility. The last one proposes an integrated operation of the P2P market with AC-OPF. All methods are assessed in a typical distribution network with high prosumers integration. The results show that the second method is the one that, fulfilling the network constraints, presents greater social welfare.& COPY; 2023 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Abstract
Current developments in heat pumps, supported by innovative business models, are driving several industry sectors to take a proactive role in future district heating and cooling networks in cities. For instance, supermarkets and data centers have been assessing the reuse of waste heat as an extra source for the district heating network, which would offset the additional investment in heat pumps. This innovative business model requires complete deregulation of the district heating market to allow industrial heat producers to provide waste heat as an additional source in the district heating network. This work proposes the application of innovative market designs for district heating networks, inspired by new practices seen in the electricity sector. More precisely, pool and Peer-to-Peer (P2P) market designs are addressed, comparing centralized and decentralized market proposals. An illustrative case of a Nordic district heating network is used to assess the performance of each market design, as well as the potential revenue that different heat producers can obtain by participating in the market. An important conclusion of this work is that the proposed market designs are in line with the new trends, encouraging the inclusion of new excess heat recovery players in district heating networks.