Details
Name
João Soares ResendeCluster
Computer ScienceRole
Research AssistantSince
01st October 2016
Centre
Advanced Computing SystemsContacts
+351220402963
joao.s.resende@inesctec.pt
2019
Authors
Sousa, PR; Cirne, A; Resende, JS; Martins, R; Antunes, L;
Publication
Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Distributed Computing and Networking, ICDCN 2019, Bangalore, India, January 04-07, 2019
Abstract
2019
Authors
Sousa, PR; Cirne, A; Resende, JS; Martins, R; Antunes, L;
Publication
Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Distributed Computing and Networking - ICDCN '19
Abstract
2019
Authors
Resende, JS; Sousa, PR; Martins, R; Antunes, L;
Publication
International Journal of Information Security
Abstract
There are many cryptographic protocols in the literature that are scientifically and mathematically sound. By extension, cryptography today seeks to respond to numerous properties of the communication process beyond confidentiality (secrecy), such as integrity, authenticity, and anonymity. In addition to the theoretical evidence, implementations must be equally secure. Due to the ever-increasing intrusion from governments and other groups, citizens are now seeking alternatives ways of communication that do not leak information. In this paper, we analyze multiparty computation (MPC), which is a sub-field of cryptography with the goal of creating methods for parties to jointly compute a function over their inputs while keeping those inputs private. This is a very useful method that can be used, for example, to carry out computations on anonymous data without having to leak that data. Thus, due to the importance of confidentiality in this type of technique, we analyze active and passive attacks using complexity measures (compression and entropy). We start by obtaining network traces and syscalls, then we analyze them using compression and entropy techniques. Finally, we cluster the traces and syscalls using standard clustering techniques. This approach does not need any deep specific knowledge of the implementations being analyzed. This paper presents a security analysis for four MPC frameworks, where three were identified as insecure. These insecure libraries leak information about the inputs provided by each party of the communication. Additionally, we have detected, through a careful analysis of its source code, that SPDZ-2’s secret sharing schema always produces the same results. © 2019, Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.
2018
Authors
Resende, JS; Sousa, PR; Antunes, L;
Publication
Trust, Privacy and Security in Digital Business - Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Abstract
2018
Authors
Resende, JS; Martins, R; Antunes, L;
Publication
2018 16th Annual Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust (PST)
Abstract
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