Details
Name
Joana ResendeCluster
Industrial and Systems EngineeringSince
09th January 2019
Nationality
PortugalCentre
Innovation, Technology and EntrepreneurshipContacts
+351222094399
joana.resende@inesctec.pt
2020
Authors
Laussel, D; Resende, J;
Publication
Economic Theory
Abstract
We investigate how asymmetric information on final demand affects strategic interaction between a downstream monopolist and a set of upstream monopolists, who independently produce complementary inputs. We study an intrinsic private common agency game in which each supplier i independently proposes a pricing schedule contract to the assembler, specifying the supplier’s payment as a function of the assembler’s purchase of input i. We provide a necessary and sufficient equilibrium condition. A lot of equilibria satisfy this condition but there is a unique Pareto-undominated Nash equilibrium from the suppliers’ point of view. In this equilibrium, there are unavoidable efficiency losses due to excessively low sales of the good. However, suppliers may be able to limit these distortions by implicitly coordinating on an equilibrium with a rigid (positive) output in bad demand circumstances. © 2019, Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.
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