2006
Autores
Teixeira, AA; Rocha, MF;
Publicação
Research in Comparative and International Education
Abstract
2006
Autores
Silva, HB; Brito, P; da Costa, JP;
Publicação
PATTERN RECOGNITION
Abstract
Applying graph theory to clustering, we propose a partitional clustering method and a clustering tendency index. No initial assumptions about the data set are requested by the method. The number of clusters and the partition that best fits the data set, are selected according to the optimal clustering tendency index value.
2006
Autores
Ferreira, PG; Azevedo, PJ;
Publicação
XXI Simpósio Brasileiro de Banco de Dados, 16-20 de Outubro, Florianópolis, Santa Catarina, Brasil, Anais/Proceedings
Abstract
2006
Autores
Tavares, AT; Teixeira, A;
Publicação
Multinationals, Clusters and Innovation: Does Public Policy Matter?
Abstract
Countries adopt policies that attract foreign multinationals, stimulate industrial clustering and foster innovation. This book links these topical issues, examining activities of multinational enterprises alongside the efficiency, appropriateness and sufficiency of such policies. With new empirical evidence, it makes practical proposals throughout.
2006
Autores
Pinto, AA; Ferreira, FA; Ferreira, F;
Publicação
2006 IEEE International Conference on Computational Cybernetics, ICCC
Abstract
We consider a symmetric Stackelberg model in which there is asymmetric demand information owned by first and second movers. We analyse the advantages of leadership and flexibility, and prove that when the leading firm faces demand uncertainty, but the follower does not, the first mover does not necessarily have advantage over the second mover. Moreover, we show that the advantage of one firm over the other depends upon the demand fluctuation and also upon the degree of substitutability of the products.
2006
Autores
Pinto, AA; Ferreira, FA; Ferreira, F;
Publicação
2006 IEEE International Conference on Computational Cybernetics, ICCC
Abstract
We consider two Cournot firms, one located in the home country and the other in the foreign country, producing substitute goods for consumption in a third country. We suppose that neither the home government nor the foreign firm know the costs of the home firm, while the foreign firm cost is common knowledge. We determine the separating sequential equilibrium outputs.
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