Abstract
We consider a price competition in a duopoly with substitutable goods, linear and symmetric demand. There is a firm (F-1) that chooses first the price p(1) of its good; the other firm (F-2) observes p(1) and then chooses the price p(2) of its good. The conclusions of this price-setting dynamical duopoly are substantially altered by the presence of either differentiated goods or asymmetric information about rival's production costs. In this paper, we consider asymmetric information about rival's production costs. We do ex-ante and ex-post analyses of firms' profits and market prices. We compare the ex-ante firms' expected profits with the ex-post firms' profits.

Abstract
Tabling is an implementation technique that overcomes some limitations of traditional Prolog systems in dealing with redundant sub-computations and recursion. A critical component in the implementation of an efficient tabling system is the design of the table space. The most popular and successful data structure for representing tables is based on a two-level trie data structure, where one trie level stores the tabled subgoal calls and the other stores the computed answers. The Global Trie (GT) is an alternative table space organization designed with the intent to reduce the tables's memory usage, namely by storing terms in a global trie, thus preventing repeated representations of the same term in different trie data structures. In this paper, we propose an extension to the GT organization, named Global Trie for Subterms (GT-ST), where compound subterms in term arguments are represented as unique entries in the GT. Experimental results using the Yap Tab tabling system show that GT-ST support has potential to achieve significant reductions on memory usage, for programs with increasing compound subterms in term arguments, without compromising the execution time for other programs.

Abstract
It is foreseeable that electricity retailers for electrical mobility will be market agents. These retailers are electric vehicle (EV) aggregation agents, which operate as a commercial middleman between electricity market and EV owners. Furthermore, with the foreseen evolution of the smart-grid concept, these agents will be able to control the EV charging rates and offer several ancillary services. This paper formulates an optimization problem for the EV aggregation agent participation in the day-ahead and secondary reserve market sessions. Forecasting issues are also discussed. The methodology was tested for two years (2009 and 2010) of the Iberian market, considering perfect and naïve forecast for all variables of the problem. © 2011 IEEE.

Abstract

Abstract
In this paper, Emission Controlled Security Constrained Unit Commitment (ECSCUC) model is proposed in power system. This model consists of a closed-loop modified Unit Commitment (UC) and Security-constrained Optimal Power Flow (SCOPF). An emission controlled formulation is developed to improve the economic-environment conditions of operation of power system. The objective of this ECSCUC model is to obtain the maximum social welfarebased system operating cost while maintaining the system security also considering the environmental impacts. This paper proposed a multi-stage multi-objective mixed-integer nonlinear programming (MINLP) to minimize system operation cost. In this paper, multi-reservoir cascaded hydro plant with time delay and thermal plants are considered for maintaining the demand. The presented formulation treats emission controlled security constrained unit commitment of hydrothermal power system which attempts to optimize both cost and emission simultaneously. The numerical examples exhibit the effectiveness of the proposed model in recent competitive electricity markets.

Abstract
The conclusions of the Bertrand model of competition are substantially altered by the presence of either differentiated goods or asymmetric information about rival's production costs. In this paper, we consider a Bertrand competition, with differentiated goods. Furthermore, we suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them according to a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that this game has exactly one Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We do ex-ante and ex-post analyses of firms' profits and market prices. We prove that the expected profit of each firm increases with the variance of its production costs. We also show that the expected price of each good increases with both expected production costs, being the effect of the expected production costs of the rival dominated by the effect of the own expected production costs.