Abstract
In this work, we consider a classic international trade model with two countries and one firm in each country. The game has two stages: in the first stage, the governments of each country use their welfare functions to choose their tariffs either: (a) competitively (Nash equilibrium) or (b) cooperatively (social optimum); in the second stage, firms competitively choose (Nash) their home and export quantities under Cournot-type competition conditions. In a previous publication we compared the competitive tariffs with the cooperative tariffs and we showed that the game is one of the two following types: (i) prisoner's dilemma (when the competitive welfare outcome is dominated by the cooperative welfare outcome); or (ii) a lose-win dilemma (an asymmetric situation where only one of the countries is damaged in the cooperative welfare outcome, whereas the other is benefited). In both scenarios, their aggregate cooperative welfare is larger than the aggregate competitive welfare. The lack of coincidence of competitive and cooperative tariffs is one of the main difficulties in international trade calling for the establishment of trade agreements. In this work, we propose a welfare-balanced trade agreement where: (i) the countries implement their cooperative tariffs and so increase their aggregate welfare from the competitive to the cooperative outcome; (ii) they redistribute the aggregate cooperative welfare according to their relative competitive welfare shares. We analyse the impact of such trade agreement in the relative shares of relevant economic quantities such as the firm's profits, consumer surplus, and custom revenue. This analysis allows the countries to add other conditions to the agreement to mitigate the effects of high changes in these relative shares. Finally, we introduce the trade agreement index measuring the gains in the aggregate welfare of the two countries. In general, we observe that when the gains are higher, the relative shares also exhibit higher changes. Hence, higher gains demand additional caution in the construction of the trade agreement to safeguard the interests of the countries.

Abstract
We study the optimal consumption, investment and life-insurance purchase and selection strategies for a wage-earner with an uncertain lifetime with access to a financial market comprised of one risk-free security and one risky-asset whose prices evolve according to linear diffusions modulated by a continuous-time stochastic process determined by an additional diffusive nonlinear stochastic differential equation. The process modulating the linear diffusions may be regarded as an indicator describing the state of the economy in a given instant of time. Additionally, we allow the Brownian motions driving each of these equations to be correlated. The life-insurance market under consideration herein consists of a fixed number of providers offering pairwise distinct contracts. We use dynamic programming techniques to characterize the solutions to the problem described above for a general family of utility functions, studying the case of discounted constant relative risk aversion utilities with more detail.

Abstract
We consider a continuous lifetime model for investor whose lifetime is a random variable. We assume the investor has an access to the social welfare system, the financial market and the life insurance market. The investor aims to find the optimal strategies that maximize the expected utility obtained from consumption, investing in the financial market, buying life insurance, registering in the social welfare system, the size of his estate in the event of premature death and the size of his fortune at time of retirement if he lives that long. We use dynamic programming techniques to derive a second-order nonlinear partial differential equation whose solution is the maximum objective function. We use special case of discounted constant relative risk aversion utilities to find an explicit solutions for the optimal strategies. Finally, we have shown a numerical solution for the problem under consideration and study some properties for the optimal strategies.

Abstract
We show that in finite settings with identical firms and consumers, asymmetric pure price equilibria with positive profits exist. We consider a price competition duopoly for a homogeneous product. Demand stems from a second-stage consumption game at posted prices, with consumers' behavior impacted by negative network effects. We characterize equilibrium prices and demand. In all subgame-perfect pure price equilibria, both firms have positive profits, and in some, firms charge different prices.

Abstract
The notion of Union is strength is essential for preserving public goods and mitigating public bads such as air quality. International environmental agreements serve this role by forming stable coalitions, in which agents join or leave based on free-riding incentives. Building on the Baliga-Maskin model, we show that such coalitions can emerge from a simple Markov chain mechanism where agents enter or exit through utility-based bargaining. However, stable coalition formation is challenging, as members may receive substantially lower utility than free-riders. This asymmetry gives rise to Barrett's paradox of cooperation: even with large coalitions and strong preferences among free-riders, overall utility may remain far below that of the grand coalition. Encouragingly, the paradox of cooperation can be resolved when free-riders have sufficiently low preferences.

Abstract
A central issue in price competition with positive network effects is the potential for small price changes to trigger abrupt chain reactions, leading to market tipping, winner-take-all scenarios, and zero-profit equilibria. We show that in a duopoly where consumers are not anonymous but partitioned into at least two groups, a simple group-based network structure can, by itself, generate downward-sloping demand and support profitable shared-market equilibria. These are subgame-perfect pure price equilibria in which both firms earn strictly positive profit. Triggering a bandwagon effect and tipping the market remains possible, but requires aggressive price deviations, or price shocks, that produce demand jumps. However, this is not always profitable, and the fear of bankruptcy can be sufficient to stabilize firms in equilibrium. The result relies on having one group with centripetal influence (stronger impact on peers) and another with centrifugal influence (stronger impact on outsiders). It requires no additional sources of heterogeneity or product differentiation. This mechanism shows that positive network effects - when group structured - can endogenously generate stability in price competition. The analysis reconciles the coexistence of local stability and the potential for tipping, offering a unified explanation of how markets with strong network effects can sustain both competition and profitability. We draw a parallel to Turing's reaction-diffusion patterns and reinterpret Becker's intuition that social influence can produce stable outcomes, even when demand may exhibit upward-sloping segments.