Abstract
We model the financial markets as a game and make predictions using Markov chain estimators. We extract the possible patterns displayed by the financial markets, define a game where one of the players is the speculator, whose strategies depend on his/her risk-to-reward preferences, and the market is the other player, whose strategies are the previously observed patterns. Then, we estimate the market's mixed probabilities by defining Markov chains and utilizing its transition matrices. Afterwards, we use these probabilities to determine which is the optimal strategy for the speculator. Finally, we apply these models to real-time market data to determine its feasibility. From this, we obtained a model for the financial markets that has a good performance in terms of accuracy and profitability.

Abstract
This paper fits in the theory of international agreements by studying the success of stable coalitions of agents seeking the preservation of a public good. Extending Baliga and Maskin, we consider a model of N homogeneous agents with quasi-linear utilities of the form u(j) (r(j); r) = r(alpha) - r(j), where r is the aggregate contribution and the exponent alpha is the elasticity of the gross utility. When the value of the elasticity alpha increases in its natural range (0, 1), we prove the following five main results in the formation of stable coalitions: (i) the gap of cooperation, characterized as the ratio of the welfare of the grand coalition to the welfare of the competitive singleton coalition grows to infinity, which we interpret as a measure of the urge or need to save the public good; (ii) the size of stable coalitions increases from 1 up to N; (iii) the ratio of the welfare of stable coalitions to the welfare of the competitive singleton coalition grows to infinity; (iv) the ratio of the welfare of stable coalitions to the welfare of the grand coalition decreases (a lot), up to when the number of members of the stable coalition is approximately N/e and after that it increases (a lot); and (v) the growth of stable coalitions occurs with a much greater loss of the coalition members when compared with free-riders. Result (v) has two major drawbacks: (a) A priori, it is difficult to convince agents to be members of the stable coalition and (b) together with results (i) and (iv), it explains and leads to the pessimistic Barrett's paradox of cooperation, even in a case not much considered in the literature: The ratio of the welfare of the stable coalitions against the welfare of the grand coalition is small, even in the extreme case where there are few (or a single) free-riders and the gap of cooperation is large. Optimistically, result (iii) shows that stable coalitions do much better than the competitive singleton coalition. Furthermore, result (ii) proves that the paradox of cooperation is resolved for larger values of.. so that the grand coalition is stabilized.

Abstract
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Abstract
For uniformly asymptotically affine (uaa) Markov maps on train tracks, we prove the following type of rigidity result: if a topological conjugacy between them is (uaa) at a point in the train track then the conjugacy is (uaa) everywhere. In particular, our methods apply to the case in which the domains of the Markov maps are Canter sets. We also present similar statements for (uaa:) and C-r Markov families. These results generalize the similar ones of Sullivan and de Faria for C-r expanding circle maps with r > 1 and have useful applications to hyperbolic dynamics on surfaces and laminations.

Abstract
We exploit ideas of nonlinear dynamics in a non-deterministic dynamical setting. Our object of study is the observed riverflow time series of the Portuguese Paiva river whose water is used for public supply. The Takens delay embedding of the daily riverflow time series revealed an intermittent dynamical behaviour due to precipitation occurrence. The laminar phase occurs in the absence of rainfall. The nearest neighbour method of prediction revealed good predictability in the laminar regime but we warn that this method is misleading in the presence of rain. The correlation integral curve analysis, Singular Value Decomposition and the Nearest Neighbour Method indicate that the laminar regime of flow is in a small neighbourhood of a one-dimensional affine subspace in the phase space. The Nearest Neighbour method attested also that in the laminar phase and for a data set of 53 years the information of the current runoff is by far the most relevant information to predict future runoff. However the information of the past two runoffs is important to correct non-linear effects of the riverflow as the MSE and MRE criteria results show. The results point out that the Nearest Neighbours method fails when used in the irregular phase because it does not predict precipitation occurrence. © 2007, Birkhäuser Verlag Basel/Switzerland.