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de interesse
Detalhes

Detalhes

006
Publicações

2020

Heuristics for Packing Semifluids

Autores
Pedroso, JP;

Publicação
CoRR

Abstract

2020

A multi-objective Monte Carlo tree search for forest harvest scheduling

Autores
Neto, T; Constantino, M; Martins, I; Pedroso, JP;

Publicação
European Journal of Operational Research

Abstract

2020

Price-and-verify: a new algorithm for recursive circle packing using Dantzig–Wolfe decomposition

Autores
Gleixner, A; Maher, SJ; Mueller, B; Pedroso, JP;

Publicação
Annals of Operations Research

Abstract

2020

Compensation Scheme With Shapley Value For Multi-Country Kidney Exchange Programmes

Autores
Biró, P; Gyetvai, M; Klimentova, X; Pedroso, JP; Pettersson, W; Viana, A;

Publicação
Proceedings of the 34th International ECMS Conference on Modelling and Simulation, ECMS 2020, Wildau, Germany, June 9-12, 2020 [the conference was canceled because of the coronavirus pandemic, the reviewed papers are published in this volume].

Abstract

2018

Competitive uncapacitated lot-sizing game

Autores
Carvalho, M; Pedroso, JP; Telha, C; Van Vyve, M;

Publicação
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PRODUCTION ECONOMICS

Abstract
We study the strategical behaviour of firms facing a lot-sizing problem with Cournot competition. Each player is a firm with her own production facility, modeled as an uncapacitated lot-sizing problem (Le., production incurs set-up and variable costs and inventories are allowed). A Cournot competition is played in each time period (market) with each player deciding the quantity of product to place on it. The market price of that product in each time period depends on the total quantity placed in the market. We show that this is a potential game with possibly multiple pure Nash equilibria. We then investigate the plausibility of these equilibria to predict the game outcome by evaluating the difficulty of computing them. If the game has a single period, we prove that an equilibrium can be found in polynomial time, but it is weakly NP hard to find an optimal pure Nash equilibrium (with respect to a given equilibrium refinement). If the game has no variable production and inventory costs, we prove that a pure Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time.

Teses
supervisionadas

2019

Domain specific languages for kidney exchange programs

Autor
João Viana

Instituição
UP-FCUP

2019

A data-driven compensation scheme for last-mile delivery with crowdsourcing

Autor
Miguel Moreira da Silva Lima Barbosa

Instituição
UP-FCUP

2019

An EDSL for Modeling Kidney Exchange Programs

Autor
João Paulo Rocha Viana

Instituição
UP-FCUP

2018

Artifical Intelligence for Jobshop Scheduling

Autor
Nicolau Filipe Barbosa Veludo dos Santos

Instituição
UP-FCUP

2018

Monte Carlo Tree Search for Combinatorial Optimization

Autor
Rui Jorge Rodrigues Rei

Instituição
UP-FCUP