2025
Autores
Cirne, A; Sousa, PR; Antunes, L; Resende, JS;
Publicação
IEEE ACCESS
Abstract
In recent years, code-reuse attacks have been used to exploit software vulnerabilities and gain control of numerous software programs and embedded devices. Several measures have been put in place to prevent this type of attack, such as Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) systems, and some of these systems have already been integrated into hardware. Nevertheless, Function-Oriented Programming (FOP) attacks, a form of code-reuse that chains functions to carry out malicious actions, continue to persist. In this work, we present the first analysis of the implications and feasibility of FOP attacks on microcontrollers, focusing on ARM Cortex-M processors that support PACBTI, that is, a hardware feature designed for CFI system implementation. During this process, we identified multiple dispatch gadgets in two common Real-time Operating System (RTOS). Since these gadgets reside within core OS functionalities, they are inherently included in a broad range of embedded operating systems. Furthermore, we also present CortexMFopper - a tool specially built to identify FOP gadgets in embedded devices and to raise awareness of this technique.
2025
Autores
Fernandes dos Santos, A; Leal, JP;
Publicação
Computational Linguistics
Abstract
2025
Autores
Mendes, R; Vilela, P;
Publicação
Encyclopedia of Cryptography, Security and Privacy, Third Edition
Abstract
[No abstract available]
2025
Autores
Queiroz, S; Vilela, JP; Ng, BKK; Lam, C; Monteiro, E;
Publicação
ITU Journal on Future and Evolving Technologies
Abstract
2025
Autores
Cunha, M; Mendes, R; de Montjoye, YA; Vilela, JP;
Publicação
SCIENTIFIC REPORTS
Abstract
The widespread availability of wireless networking, such as Wi-Fi, has led to the pervasiveness of always connected mobile devices. These devices are provided with several sensors that allow the collection of large amounts of data, which pose a threat to personal privacy. It is well known that Wi-Fi connectivity information (e.g. BSSID) can be used for inferring user locations. This has caused the imposition of limitations to the access to such data in mobile devices. However, other sources of information about wireless connectivity are available, such as the Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI). In this work, we show that RSSI can be used to infer the presence of a user at common locations throughout time. This information can be correlated with other features, such as the hour of the day, to further learn semantic context about such locations with a prediction performance above 90%. Our analysis shows the privacy implications of inferring user locations through Wi-Fi RSSI, but also emphasizes the fingerprinting risk that results from the lack of protection when accessing RSSI measurements.
2025
Autores
Gomes, C; Mendes, R; Vilela, JP;
Publicação
2025 IEEE 10TH EUROPEAN SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY, EUROS&P
Abstract
Federated Learning (FL), a distributed learning mechanism where data is decentralized across multiple devices and periodic gradient updates are shared, is an alternative to centralized training that aims to address privacy issues arising from raw data sharing. Despite the expected privacy benefits, prior research showcases the potential privacy leakage derived from overfitting, exploited by passive attacks. However, limited attention has been given to understanding and defending against active threats that increase model leakage by interfering with the training process, instead of relying on overfitting. This work addresses this gap by introducing Active Attribute Inference (AAI*), a novel active attack that encodes sensitive attribute information by making any targeted training sample leave a distinguishable footprint on the gradient of maliciously modified neurons [8]. Results, using two real-world datasets, show that it is possible to successfully encode sensitive information incurring a small error in terms of neuron activation. More importantly, on a practical scenario, AAI. can improve upon a state-of-theart approach by achieving over 90% of restricted ROC AUC, therefore increasing model leakage. To defend against such active attacks, this work introduces several attack detection strategies tailored for different levels of the defender's knowledge. Including the novel White-box Attack Detection Mechanism (WADM*) that detects abnormal changes in weights distribution, and two black-box strategies based on the monitorization of model performance. Results show that the detection rate can be 100% on both datasets. Remarkably, WADM. reduces any attack to random guessing while preserving model utility, offering significant improvements over existing defenses, particularly when clients are non-IID. By proposing active attacks against well-generalized models and effective countermeasures, this research contributes to a better understanding of privacy in FL systems.
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