Abstract
Purpose - We develop a theoretical model to analyze the role that financial conglomerates may play in reducing agency costs in target firms. Methodology/Approach - We develop a model to analyze the activism of a financial conglomerate (that includes investment banking besides mutual fund management activities) in monitoring the managers of a listed firm. The specific problem we study is this: should the managers of a listed company undertake a new project within the firm or should they develop it outside of the firm with the help of a bank? Should or not the financial conglomerate help the managers undertake the project outside of the existing firm at the expenses of the investors of the mutual fund that it manages, but collecting fees from the investment banking activities? Findings - It will be attractive to both the financial conglomerate and the managers to develop the project outside of the firm if the fees charged by the financial conglomerate for the provision of investment banking services are within a certain range. However, a more intense reaction to performance from the fund investors will translate to a greater space of converging interests between the conglomerate shareholders and mutual fund investors. Additionally, if fees earned by the mutual fund company are a large source of income for the conglomerate, then the lower will be its tendency to assist the managers. Social implications - From a regulatory standpoint, the implementation of measures aimed at transferring capital between funds without cost would allow mutual fund investors to intensify their reaction to fund performance, therefore increasing the likelihood of lower agency costs. We also conclude that supervisory authorities should pay special attention to the banking relationships of firms and banks to whom the asset management component is secondary and with smaller direct stakes in the said firm. Originality/Value of paper - We develop a theoretical framework to explain the absence of activism of institutional investors integrated in financial conglomerates in the governance of listed firms.

Abstract
In this paper we investigate the incremental information content of a sample of 1,751 quarterly financial reports, issued in Portugal between 1994 and 2004. Specifically, we examine price and volume reactions to financial reports issued in: (1) the first and third quarters, which are unaudited; (2) the second quarter, which is subject to limited audit; and (3) the fourth quarter (the annual report) which is subject to a full audit. We conclude that unaudited first and third quarter financial reports that include condensed income statements and balance sheets convey enough new information to the market to spur significant price and trading reactions. This conclusion holds before and after the first and third quarter reports were made mandatory in 1999. We also found that the incremental information content of the second quarter report dropped after 1999, presumably because part of its information content was usurped by the newly required first quarter reports. Finally, we found evidence that mandatory audited reports announcements spur more significant price reactions than mandatory unaudited financial reports. In contrast to evidence from other countries, we found that smaller firms' disclosures do not generate a larger reaction than large firms' disclosures.

Abstract
The potential manager-investor conflict of interests in mutual funds is a classic agency problem. Using a database from Portugal, we show that mutual funds tend to overweight the stocks issued by their parent and underweigh the stocks of competitors. This cannot be explained by performance, risk, securities' characteristics or information advantage; funds invest in the stock of their parent company especially when there is widespread selling, and avoid selling them when the stock is experiencing low performance. This agency relationship is costly for fund investors: compared with the competitor's stock, the parent's stock underperforms after being acquired by the fund. © 2010 Taylor & Francis.

Abstract
The absence of investor reaction to the poor performance of mutual funds is a widely reported phenomenon. This article investigates the role of load costs as an explanation for the phenomenon and concludes that back-end load fees are an obstacle to reaction. We found evidence consistent with the hypothesis that medium and long-term investors do not react to poor performances due to the fact that they are 'imprisoned' by back-end load fees.

Abstract
We develop a model of quantity and price competition for low cost airlines based on announcements of new routes and their impacts on the announcer and on its rival. We find that both firms' profits may rise or fall as a result of an announcement of new routes, depending on launching costs for the announcer, and on whether market expansion or market substitution is dominant for the rival. We present an empirical study for two European low cost airlines that shows asymmetric behaviour: while EasyJet announcements have positive effects on Ryanair's share price, the opposite is does not occur. This suggests that an airline's reputation for reacting in response to rivals' announcements may affect the stock market and may thus affect announcement behaviour.

Abstract
In this paper, we investigate whether different business models in the same industry (passenger air transportation) lead to different corporate governance models. We found that low-cost carriers organise their boards differently from full service carriers to achieve lower costs and a faster decision-making process that is required by their business model. We also found that low-cost carriers and full service carriers solve their potential agency cost problems differently and that full service carriers have more board monitoring committees, and low-cost carriers have a closer coincidence of interests between shareholders and executive directors.