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Publicações

Publicações por António Miguel Costa

2018

y Unilateral effects screens for partial horizontal acquisitions: The generalized HHI and GUPPI

Autores
Brito, D; Osorio, A; Ribeiro, R; Vasconcelos, H;

Publicação
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION

Abstract
Recent years have witnessed an increased interest, by competition agencies, in assessing the competitive effects of partial acquisitions. We propose a generalization of the two most traditional indicators used to screen unilateral anti-competitive effects - the HerfindahlHirschman Index and the Gross Up- ward Price Pressure Index - to partial horizontal acquisition settings. The proposed generalized indicators are endogenously derived under a probabilistic voting model in which the manager of each firm is elected in a shareholder assembly between two potential candidates who seek to obtain utility from an exogenous rent associated with corporate office. The model (i) can cope with settings involving all types of owners and rights: owners that can be internal to the industry (rival firms) and external to the industry; and rights that can capture financial and corporate control interests, can be direct and indirect, can be partial or full, (ii) yields an endogenous measure of the owners ultimate corporate control rights, and (iii) can also be used - in case the potential acquisition is inferred to likely enhance market power - to devise divestiture structural remedies. We also provide an empirical application of the two proposed generalized indicators to several acquisitions in the wet shaving industry, with the objective of providing practitioners with a step-by-step illustration of how to compute them in antitrust cases.

2018

On the impossibility of a perfect counting method to allocate the credits of multi-authored publications

Autores
Osório, A;

Publicação
Scientometrics

Abstract

2019

Gender differences in competition: gender equality and cost reduction policies

Autores
Osório, A;

Publicação
Review of Economic Design

Abstract

2012

A folk theorem for games when frequent monitoring decreases noise

Autores
Osório, AM;

Publicação
B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

Abstract
This paper studies frequent monitoring in an infinitely repeated game with imperfect public information and discounting, where players observe the state of a continuous time Brownian process at moments in time of length ?. It shows that a limit folk theorem can be achieved with imperfect public monitoring when players monitor each other at the highest frequency, i.e., 0. The approach assumes that the expected joint output depends exclusively on the action profile simultaneously and privately decided by the players at the beginning of each period of the game, but not on ?. The strong decreasing effect on the expected immediate gains from deviation when the interval between actions shrinks, and the associated increase precision of the public signals, make the result possible in the limit. © 2012 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston 2012.

2013

The lottery Blotto game

Autores
Osorio, A;

Publicação
ECONOMICS LETTERS

Abstract
In this paper we relax the Colonel Blotto game assumption that for a given battle the player who allocates the higher measure of resources wins that battle. We assume that for a given battle, the Colonel who allocates the higher measure of resources is more likely to win. We have a simpler model for which we are able to compute all Nash equilibria in pure strategies for any valuations profile that players might have, something that is not possible for the original Blotto game.

2016

Bankruptcy problems with two references: an impartial compromise

Autores
Giménez Gómez, JM; Osório, A; Peris, JE;

Publicação
TOP

Abstract
Pulido et al. (Annals Oper Res 158:133–141, 2008) present an extension of the classical bankruptcy problem (O’Neill in Math Social Sci 2:345–371, 1982) where the involved agents have, apart from the claims vector, an additional reference vector. To analyze this extended problem, they propose the extreme and the diagonal approaches, both of them restricted to the case in which the reference vector is lower than the claims vector. We note that if the claims and the reference vectors are interchanged, the allocation proposed by the extreme approach varies. Therefore, by introducing the idea of impartiality, in the current approach, we propose an extension of their model in which no relation is assumed between the claims and reference vectors. © 2015, Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa.

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