Abstract
We construct a Teichmuller space for the C1+-conjugacy classes of hyperbolic dynamical systems on surfaces. After introducing the notion of an HR structure which associates an affine structure with each of the stable and unstable laminations, we show that there is a one-to-one correspondence between these HR structures and the C1+-conjugacy classes. As part of the proof we construct a canonical representative dynamical system for each HR structure. This has the smoothest holonomies of any representative of the corresponding C1+-conjugacy class. Finally, we introduce solenoid functions and show that they provide a good Teichmuller space.

Abstract
Given a hyperbolic invariant set of a diffeomorphism on a surface, it is proved that, if the holonomies are sufficiently smooth, then the diffeomorphism on the hyperbolic invariant set is rigid in the sense that it is C1+ conjugate to a hyperbolic affine model.

Abstract
We present an infinite dimensional space of C1+ smooth conjugacy classes of circle diffeomorphisms that are C1+ fixed points of renormalization. We exhibit a one-to-one correspondence between these C1+ fixed points of renormalization and C1+ conjugacy classes of Anosov diffeomorphisms.

Abstract
We present a tourism model where the choice of a resort by a tourist depends not only on the product offered in the resort, but also on the characteristics of the other tourists staying in the resort. In order to explore the effect of the types of the tourists in the allocation of tourists across resorts, we introduce a game theoretical model and describe the relevant Nash equilibria.

Abstract
We consider a price competition in a duopoly with substitutable goods, linear and symmetric demand. There is a firm (F-1) that chooses first the price p(1) of its good; the other firm (F-2) observes p(1) and then chooses the price p(2) of its good. The conclusions of this price-setting dynamical duopoly are substantially altered by the presence of either differentiated goods or asymmetric information about rival's production costs. In this paper, we consider asymmetric information about rival's production costs. We do ex-ante and ex-post analyses of firms' profits and market prices. We compare the ex-ante firms' expected profits with the ex-post firms' profits.

Abstract
The conclusions of the Bertrand model of competition are substantially altered by the presence of either differentiated goods or asymmetric information about rival's production costs. In this paper, we consider a Bertrand competition, with differentiated goods. Furthermore, we suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them according to a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that this game has exactly one Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We do ex-ante and ex-post analyses of firms' profits and market prices. We prove that the expected profit of each firm increases with the variance of its production costs. We also show that the expected price of each good increases with both expected production costs, being the effect of the expected production costs of the rival dominated by the effect of the own expected production costs.