Desde01 janeiro 2012
CentroLaboratório de Inteligência Artificial e Apoio à Decisão
Martins, J; Pinto, A;
Inspired by the Daley-Kendall and Goffman-Newill models, we propose an Ignorant-Believer-Unbeliever rumor (or fake news) spreading model with the following characteristics: (i) a network contact between individuals that determines the spread of rumors; (ii) the value (cost versus benefit) for individuals who search for truthful information (learning); (iii) an impact measure that assesses the risk of believing the rumor; (iv) an individual search strategy based on the probability that an individual searches for truthful information; (v) the population search strategy based on the proportion of individuals of the population who decide to search for truthful information; (vi) a payoff for the individuals that depends on the parameters of the model and the strategies of the individuals. Furthermore, we introduce evolutionary information search dynamics and study the dynamics of population search strategies. For each value of searching for information, we compute evolutionarily stable information (ESI) search strategies (occurring in non-cooperative environments), which are the attractors of the information search dynamics, and the optimal information (OI) search strategy (occurring in (eventually forced) cooperative environments) that maximizes the expected information payoff for the population. For rumors that are advantageous or harmful to the population (positive or negative impact), we show the existence of distinct scenarios that depend on the value of searching for truthful information. We fully discuss which evolutionarily stable information (ESI) search strategies and which optimal information (OI) search strategies eradicate (or not) the rumor and the corresponding expected payoffs. As a corollary of our results, a recommendation for legislators and policymakers who aim to eradicate harmful rumors is to make the search for truthful information free or rewarding.
Martins, J; Pinto, A; Stollenwerk, N;
In this work, we introduce the concept of maximum curvature to separate the low from high reinfection levels. For each temporary immunity transition rate, the threshold value is the infection rate where the positive curvature of the endemic stationary state attains its maximum value. Hence, the maximum curvature reinfection threshold can be interpreted as the moment when the graph of the stationary state of infected attains the maximum change in its direction. When the temporary immunity transition rate tends to zero, the limiting point of the maximum curvature reinfection threshold coincides with the Gomes' reinfection threshold and the curvature blows up to infinity.
Martins, J; Pinto, A;
BULLETIN OF MATHEMATICAL BIOLOGY
We use the reinfection SIRI epidemiological model to analyze the impact of education programs and vaccine scares on individuals decisions to vaccinate or not. The presence of the reinfection provokes the novelty of the existence of three Nash equilibria for the same level of the morbidity relative risk instead of a single Nash equilibrium as occurs in the SIR model studied by Bauch and Earn (PNAS 101:13391-13394, 2004). The existence of three Nash equilibria, with two of them being evolutionary stable, introduces two scenarios with relevant and opposite features for the same level of the morbidity relative risk: the low-vaccination scenario corresponding to the evolutionary stable vaccination strategy, where individuals will vaccinate with a low probability; and the high-vaccination scenario corresponding to the evolutionary stable vaccination strategy, where individuals will vaccinate with a high probability. We introduce the evolutionary vaccination dynamics for the SIRI model and we prove that it is bistable. The bistability of the evolutionary dynamics indicates that the damage provoked by false scares on the vaccination perceived morbidity risks can be much higher and much more persistent than in the SIR model. Furthermore, the vaccination education programs to be efficient they need to implement a mechanism to suddenly increase the vaccination coverage level.
Martins, J; Banik, N; Pinto, AA;
Springer Proceedings in Mathematics and Statistics
In this work, we study the phenomena of dumping in a duopoly market through an infinitely repeated game. We consider two firms of different countries competing in the same country. When both firms are cooperating, if the foreign firm deviates from cooperation this can be interpreted as dumping and a period of punishment can be imposed to the foreign firm. After this, firms can play continuously the deviation-punishment game or compete à la Cournot. Previously, we observe that the repeated strategy of deviation-punishment is not adopted in the case of symmetric demand equations. Here, we observe that this strategy of repeated dumping can appear as the best repeated strategy when the demand equations are non-symmetric. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016.
José Martins; Alberto Pinto; N. Stollenwerk
Mathematical Biosciences - Mathematical Biosciences, vol.236, no.2, pp.126-131
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