Detalhes
Nome
António Miguel CostaCargo
Investigador Colaborador ExternoDesde
01 abril 2018
Nacionalidade
PortugalCentro
Laboratório de Inteligência Artificial e Apoio à DecisãoContactos
+351220402963
antonio.m.costa@inesctec.pt
2019
Autores
Osório A.;
Publicação
Review of Economic Design
Abstract
This paper investigates the implications of the unequal division of the domestic labor in men and women’s participation and effort incentives in competitive relations, in which the labor market is the main example. We found that moderate levels of affirmative action (i.e., bias in favor of women) incentivize men and women to exert more effort and women’s participation. However, it cannot guarantee full participation and equal effort among men and women without inducing economic inefficiency or even distorting the labor market. Given these limitations, we consider the effects of an alternative policy that supports the men’s involvement in the domestic tasks. The main conclusion is that if we want men and women to have the same opportunities in the labor market, we must solve the household problem first. While women hold a larger share of the domestic labor, they are in a weaker position to compete with men. We expect that our findings will guide researchers and decision-makers implementing effective policies that can allow men and women to have the same labor market opportunities.
2018
Autores
Brito, D; Osorio, A; Ribeiro, R; Vasconcelos, H;
Publicação
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
Abstract
Recent years have witnessed an increased interest, by competition agencies, in assessing the competitive effects of partial acquisitions. We propose a generalization of the two most traditional indicators used to screen unilateral anti-competitive effects - the HerfindahlHirschman Index and the Gross Up- ward Price Pressure Index - to partial horizontal acquisition settings. The proposed generalized indicators are endogenously derived under a probabilistic voting model in which the manager of each firm is elected in a shareholder assembly between two potential candidates who seek to obtain utility from an exogenous rent associated with corporate office. The model (i) can cope with settings involving all types of owners and rights: owners that can be internal to the industry (rival firms) and external to the industry; and rights that can capture financial and corporate control interests, can be direct and indirect, can be partial or full, (ii) yields an endogenous measure of the owners ultimate corporate control rights, and (iii) can also be used - in case the potential acquisition is inferred to likely enhance market power - to devise divestiture structural remedies. We also provide an empirical application of the two proposed generalized indicators to several acquisitions in the wet shaving industry, with the objective of providing practitioners with a step-by-step illustration of how to compute them in antitrust cases.
2018
Autores
Osório A.;
Publicação
Scientometrics
Abstract
The problem on how to distribute the publication credits among ordered coauthors has been extensively discussed in the literature. However, there is no consensus about what is the most adequate procedure. This paper studies the properties of the existing counting methods and shows an impossibility result regarding the existence of a general counting method able to satisfy no advantageous merging and no advantageous splitting simultaneously—two properties that we consider fundamental. Our results suggest that the generalized variations of the geometric and the harmonic counting methods are the most flexible and robust in theoretical terms.
2017
Autores
Osório, A;
Publicação
European Journal of Operational Research
Abstract
In many economic situations, individuals with different bargaining power must agree on how to divide a given resource. For instance, in the dictator game the proposer has all the bargaining power. In spite of it, the majority of controlled experiments show that she shares an important amount of the resource with the receiver. In the present paper I consider how behavioural and psychological internal conflicting aspects, such as self-interest and equity concerns, determine the split of the resource. The individual allocation proposals are aggregated in terms of altruism and value for the resource under dispute to obtain a single allocation. The resulting allocation rule is generalized to the n-individuals case through efficiency and consistency. Finally, I show that it satisfies a set of desirable properties. The obtained results are of practical interest for a number of situations, such as river sharing problems, sequential allocation and rationing problems. © 2017 Elsevier B.V.
2017
Autores
Osório, A;
Publicação
Group Decision and Negotiation
Abstract
In this paper, we consider a sequential allocation problem with n individuals. The first individual can consume any amount of a resource, leaving the remainder for the second individual, and so on. Motivated by the limitations associated with the cooperative or non-cooperative solutions, we propose a new approach from basic definitions of representativeness and equal treatment. The result is a unique asymptotic allocation rule for any number of individuals. We show that it satisfies a set of desirable properties. © 2016, Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht.
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