Abstract

Abstract
The chemical-pharmaceutical sector is facing an unprecedented fast-changing environment, with new market and technological trends impacting the companies' operational strategies. Managing the pharmaceutical supply chain (PSC) operations is, therefore, ever more complex and challenging. The goal of this work is to present a comprehensive overview of the current state of the industry and research developments; and then, to develop a new decision-making reference framework to assist in the creation of optimization-based decision support models. This will be achieved through a multi-perspective analysis that encompasses strategic and tactical planning decision-making, in the current and future business context of the chemical-pharmaceutical industry. The findings reveal a lack of research addressing the most prominent trends currently driving this sector, such as patient centricity or new technological developments, thus highlighting the disruptive nature of the expected changes in a highly conservative industry.

Abstract

Abstract
The recent ability of plasmonic nanostructures to probe subnanometer and even atomic scales demands theories that can account for the nonlocal dynamics of the electron gas. The hydrodynamic Drude model (HDM) captures much of the microscopic dynamics of the quantum mechanical effects when additional boundary conditions are considered. Here, we revisit the HDM under the Madelung formalism to reexpress its coupled system of equations as a single nonlinear Schrodinger equation in order to have a natural quantum mechanical description of plasmonics. Specifically, we study the response of two overlapping nanowires with this formalism. We ensure that an proposed frame concurs with classical electrodynamics when the local response approximation holds in the plasmonic system by finding the correction needed.

Abstract
We investigate how asymmetric information on final demand affects strategic interaction between a downstream monopolist and a set of upstream monopolists, who independently produce complementary inputs. We study an intrinsic private common agency game in which each supplieriindependently proposes a pricing schedule contract to the assembler, specifying the supplier's payment as a function of the assembler's purchase of inputi. We provide a necessary and sufficient equilibrium condition. A lot of equilibria satisfy this condition but there is a unique Pareto-undominated Nash equilibrium from the suppliers' point of view. In this equilibrium, there are unavoidable efficiency losses due to excessively low sales of the good. However, suppliers may be able to limit these distortions by implicitly coordinating on an equilibrium with a rigid (positive) output in bad demand circumstances.

Abstract