Abstract
The EUniversal project, funded by the European Union, aims to establish a universal approach to the utilization of flexibility by Distribution System Operators (DSOs) and their engagement with new flexibility markets. To achieve this objective, the project team has focused on developing the Universal Market Enabling Interface (UMEI) concept. This paper presents an overview of the process of adapting grid core systems to interact with different market platforms and agents, which is a key aspect of the real-world demonstration set to take place in Portugal. © The Institution of Engineering and Technology 2023.

Abstract
In Walrasian markets, an auctioneer proposes a price to the market participants, who react by revealing the quantities they are willing to buy or sell at this price. The auctioneer then proposes new prices to improve the demand and supply match until the equilibrium is reached. This market, common for stock exchanges, has also been proposed for electricity markets like power electricity exchanges, where iterations among auctioneer and market participants take place before the interval settlement period (ISP) until supply and demand match and a stable price is reached. We propose a Walrasian design for local electricity markets where the iterations between auctioneer and market participants happen in real time, so previous imbalances are used to correct the proposed price for the next ISP. The designs are simulated to test convergence and their capability of achieving efficient dynamic prices.

Abstract
When the price of the energy shared within an energy community is based on a local energy market, it is the responsibility of each participant to bid adequately so that participating provides a larger benefit than not participating. Alternatively, centralized energy community bill minimization may be an option, but a mechanism to share the collective benefits among the members is needed. This mechanism should be fair and easy to explain, no members should be harmed with respect to their individual optimal behavior and should provide the right economic signal. This paper analyses and compares some common pricing mechanisms for the internal compensation for the energy shared among the members of an energy community centrally managed. Simple case examples are used to identify those pricing mechanisms that are fairer and provide the righter economic signals to the participants.

Abstract

Abstract
The constant growth of wind farms in the Brazilian electric system increases the concerns regarding power quality, especially related to harmonic distortions. At the same time, wind generation also becomes relevant in the context of power system stability, operating as ancillary services. One of the requirements of the system operator is the injection of reactive power by the wind farms to maintain the voltage levels. Considering that the actual studies only considers the operation of the wind generators with unitary power factor, the present work aims to evaluate the harmonic impact of Wind farms operating with reactive power injection on the electric system buses. For this purpose two monitoring campaigns in a wind farm of the CPFL Renováveis were performed with different power factors operating modes in the wind generators. These results were utilized in computational studies to evaluate the impact in voltage distortion at the PCC. The results obtained in this work demonstrated a significant impact on the harmonic current generation and in the voltage harmonic distortion due to the reactive power injection by the wind generators of the wind farm.

Abstract
This paper proposes a three-stage model for managing energy communities for local energy sharing and providing grid flexibility services to tackle local distribution grid constraints. The first stage addresses the minimization of each prosumer's individual energy bill by optimizing the schedules of their flexible resources. The second stage optimizes the energy bill of the whole energy community by sharing the prosumers' energy surplus internally and re-dispatching their batteries, while guaranteeing that each prosumer's new energy bill is always be equal to or less than the bill that results for this prosumer from stage one. This collective optimization is designed to ensure an additional collective benefit, without loss for any community member. The third stage, which can be performed by the distribution system operator (DSO), aims to solve the local grid constraints by re-dispatching the flexible resources and, if still necessary, by curtailing local generation or consumption. Stage three minimizes the impact on the schedule obtained at previous stages by minimizing the loss of profit or utility for all prosumers, which are furthermore financially compensated accordingly. This paper describes how the settlement should be performed, including the allocation coefficients to be sent to the DSO to determine the self-consumed and supplied energies of each peer. Finally, some case studies allow an assessment of the performance of the proposed methodology. Results show, among other things, the potential benefits of allowing the allocation coefficients to take negative values to increase the retail market competition; the importance of stage one or, alternatively, the need for a fair internal price to avoid unfair collective benefit sharing among the community members; or how stage three can effectively contribute to grid constraint solving, profiting first from the existing flexible resources.