Abstract
In this age of technology, information, innovation, and so many other features that could be associated with it, it becomes necessary to review the benefits and risks associated with this change. The question that guides this article is: Does the easiness granted to us, through the many online mechanisms, affect our ability to perceive at the moment of making a purchase decision? Rather, from a financial perspective, is the quick and easy way that the internet allows the consumer to make a payment influencing the consumers' buying act? Through the analysis of various mobile applications available for the aforementioned purpose, as well as a survey, that featured 137 answers from various age groups and occupations, we will present a brief conclusion about this theme, aiming to contribute to a better and broader understanding of the benefits, risks, advantages and disadvantages of these so well-known banking applications that increasingly stand out in the daily lives of the Portuguese. The results of this exploratory study reveal the importance of a greater and better instruction when using these innovative tools, so the user can stop being merely a hostage to their risks and begin to fully enjoy the benefits.

Abstract
For many years, industrial engineers and managers have differentiated their duties in the work environment. While this has allowed for the two specialities to operate in their respective domains, the all necessary integration required to deliver a seamless industrial operation and outcomes has been sub-optimal - particularly in cases of conflict of knowledge or power. Industrial engineering and management (IEM) has come to resolve this situation, creating a new professional field and profile, as well as a multifaceted specialisation with a practical character. The challenge to take the next step in the refinement of this relatively new reality in Portugal is placed upon the most recent IEM degree, at the University of Tras-os-Montes e Alto Douro (UTAD).

Abstract
Fibrinogen (Fg) is a pro-inflammatory protein with pro-healing properties. Previous work showed that fibrinogen 3D scaffolds (Fg-3D) promote bone regeneration, but the cellular players were not identified. Osteoclasts are bone resorbing cells that promote bone remodeling in close crosstalk with osteoblasts. Herein, the capacity of osteoclasts differentiated on Fg-3D to degrade the scaffolds and promote osteoblast differentiation was evaluated in vitro. Fg-3D scaffolds were prepared by freeze-drying and osteoclasts were differentiated from primary human peripheral blood monocytes. Results obtained showed osteoclasts expressing the enzymes cathepsin K and tartrate resistant acid phosphatase colonizing Fg-3D scaffolds. Osteoclasts were able to significantly degrade Fg-3D, reducing the scaffold's area, and increasing D-dimer concentration, a Fg degradation product, in their culture media. Osteoclast conditioned media from the first week of differentiation promoted significantly stronger human primary mesenchymal stem/stromal cell (MSC) osteogenic differentiation, evaluated by alkaline phosphatase activity. Moreover, week 1 osteoclast conditioned media promoted earlier MSC osteogenic differentiation, than chemical osteogenesis inductors. TGF-beta 1 was found increased in osteoclast conditioned media from week 1, when compared to week 3 of differentiation. Taken together, our results suggest that osteoclasts are able to differentiate and degrade Fg-3D, producing factors like TGF-beta 1 that promote MSC osteogenic differentiation.

Abstract
When the COVID-19 pandemic hits Portugal in early March 2020, medical doctors, engineers and researchers, with the encouragement of the Northern Region Health Administration, teamed up to develop and build, locally and in a short time, a ventilator that might eventually be used in extreme emergency situations in the hospitals of northern Portugal. This letter tells you the story of Pneuma, a low-cost emergency ventilator designed and built under harsh isolation constraints, that gave birth to derivative designs in Brazil and Morocco, has been industrialized with 200 units being produced, and is now looking forward to the certification as a medical device that will possibly support a go-tomarket launch. Open intellectual property (IP), multi disciplinarity teamwork, fast prototyping and product engineering have shortened to a few months an otherwise quite longer idea-to-product route, clearly demonstrating that when scientific and engineering knowledge hold hands great challenges can be successfully faced.

Abstract
We investigate how asymmetric information on final demand affects strategic interaction between a downstream monopolist and a set of upstream monopolists, who independently produce complementary inputs. We study an intrinsic private common agency game in which each supplieriindependently proposes a pricing schedule contract to the assembler, specifying the supplier's payment as a function of the assembler's purchase of inputi. We provide a necessary and sufficient equilibrium condition. A lot of equilibria satisfy this condition but there is a unique Pareto-undominated Nash equilibrium from the suppliers' point of view. In this equilibrium, there are unavoidable efficiency losses due to excessively low sales of the good. However, suppliers may be able to limit these distortions by implicitly coordinating on an equilibrium with a rigid (positive) output in bad demand circumstances.

Abstract
We present a model of market hyper-segmentation, where a monopolist acquires within a short time all information about the preferences of consumers who purchase its vertically differentiated products. The firm offers a new price/quality schedule after each commitment period. Lower consumer types may have an incentive to delay their purchases until next period to obtain a better introductory offer. The monopolist counters this incentive by offering higher informational rents. Considering the dynamic game played by the monopolist and its customers, we find that there is always a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) in which the firm immediately sells the good to all customers, offering the Mussa-Rosen static equilibrium schedule to first time customers (and getting full commitment profits). However, if the commitment period between two offers is long enough, there is another MPE with gradual market expansion. Contrary to the Coasian result for a durable-good monopoly, we find that in both equilibria the profit of the monopolist increases (and the aggregate consumers surplus decreases) as the interval of commitment shrinks. The model yields policy implications for regulations on collection and storage of customers information.