Abstract
This work considers sustainable scheduling of manufacturing operations and preventive maintenance activities in a single-machine environment where the machine works continuously in three eight-hour shifts per day. The jobs can be produced at different processing speeds, which reduces energy consumption and/or processing times. In a tri-objective mixed integer linear programming model, sustainability is attained through minimizing total weighted earliness/ tardiness - economic pillar, total energy consumption - environmental pillar, and number of undesired activities - social pillar. Moreover, a multi-objective genetic algorithm finds near optimal solutions in a timely manner. Numerical results will be presented at the conference.

Abstract
The problem of the consumption or provision of common and public goods is a well known and well studied problem in economic sciences. The nature of the problem is the existence of non-excludable externalities which gives rise to incentives to free-riding behaviour. There are several economical frameworks trying to deal with the problem such as coalition theory or mechanism design and implementation theory to ensure a Pareto efficient consumption or provision of such good. Baliga and Maskin considered an environmental game where several communities face a problem of pollution reduction. They show that all communities except one of them have incentives to act as a free-rider, i.e. only one community is willing to face the costs that air cleaning implies, namely the one with greatest preference for the good. In this work we introduce an adaptive evolutionary dynamics for the generalization of the Baliga-Maskin model to quasi-linear utility functions. We show that the Baliga-Maskin equilibrium is the only asymptotically stable dynamical equilibrium, all others being unstable. This result reasserts the problem of free-riding and externalities for the case of a common good in a dynamically/evolutionary setting, and reiterates the relevance of mechanism design and coalition formation in the context of dynamical models.

Abstract
We study the equilibria of an Ordinary Differencial Equation (ODE) system where CD4+ effector or helper T cells and Regulatory T cells (Tregs) are present. T cells trigger an immune response in the presence of their specific antigen. Regulatory T cells (Tregs) play a role in limiting auto-immune diseases due to their immune-suppressive ability. Here, we present explicit exact formulas that give the relationship between the concentration of T cells, the concentration of Tregs, and the antigenic stimulation of T cells, when the system is at equilibria, stable or unstable. We found a parameter region of bistability, limited by two thresholds of antigenic stimulation of T cells (hysteresis). Moreover, there are values of the slope parameter of the tuning for which an isola-center bifurcation appears, and, for some other values, there is a transcritical bifurcation. We also present time evolutions of the ODE system.

Abstract
Inspired by the Daley-Kendall and Goffman-Newill models, we propose an Ignorant-Believer-Unbeliever rumor (or fake news) spreading model with the following characteristics: (i) a network contact between individuals that determines the spread of rumors; (ii) the value (cost versus benefit) for individuals who search for truthful information (learning); (iii) an impact measure that assesses the risk of believing the rumor; (iv) an individual search strategy based on the probability that an individual searches for truthful information; (v) the population search strategy based on the proportion of individuals of the population who decide to search for truthful information; (vi) a payoff for the individuals that depends on the parameters of the model and the strategies of the individuals. Furthermore, we introduce evolutionary information search dynamics and study the dynamics of population search strategies. For each value of searching for information, we compute evolutionarily stable information (ESI) search strategies (occurring in non-cooperative environments), which are the attractors of the information search dynamics, and the optimal information (OI) search strategy (occurring in (eventually forced) cooperative environments) that maximizes the expected information payoff for the population. For rumors that are advantageous or harmful to the population (positive or negative impact), we show the existence of distinct scenarios that depend on the value of searching for truthful information. We fully discuss which evolutionarily stable information (ESI) search strategies and which optimal information (OI) search strategies eradicate (or not) the rumor and the corresponding expected payoffs. As a corollary of our results, a recommendation for legislators and policymakers who aim to eradicate harmful rumors is to make the search for truthful information free or rewarding.

Abstract
Recent years witnessed an increase in income inequality. Several explanations have been put forward. In the present paper, we consider a series of technologically related events that have been crucial for the increased income inequality, that is, public R&D incentives, increasing horizontal integration and spillover effects. We found that public R&D incentives and the increasing horizontal integration have biased the income distribution towards the top income group. In particular, the high-skilled workers involved in the R&D process have benefited enormously from this process. Similarly, capital owners have seen an increase in their profits, because of the reduction in product market competition and technological improvements in the production process. We found the effect of knowledge spillovers to be less clear-cut. We conclude discussing the implications of our results and suggesting possible solutions to the increasing income inequality. We call for the creation of supranational institutions, and for stricter legislation on competition and antitrust policy.

Abstract
This paper compares the export promotion system of advanced and emerging economies in fifty countries. Results show that advanced economies offer, on average, more complete export promotion system, i.e. a greater variety of Export Promotion Programs (EPPs) than emerging economies. Advanced countries offer more financial support, informational services, facilitating activities and education and training services. The specific services that contribute most to these differences are also identified, which is important for national export promotion agencies and policy makers to upgrade their offer to firms in order for them to be better prepared for international trade interactions, especially emerging economies.