Abstract
Jasmin is a framework for developing high-speed and high-assurance cryptographic software. The framework is structured around the Jasmin programming language and its compiler. The language is designed for enhancing portability of programs and for simplifying verification tasks. The compiler is designed to achieve predictability and efficiency of the output code (currently limited to x64 platforms), and is formally verified in the Coq proof assistant. Using the SUPER COP framework, we evaluate the Jasmin compiler on representative cryptographic routines and conclude that the code generated by the compiler is as efficient as fast, hand-crafted, implementations. Moreover, the framework includes highly automated tools for proving memory safety and constant-time security (for protecting against cache-based timing attacks). We also demonstrate the effectiveness of the verification tools on a large set of cryptographic routines.

Abstract
We present a high-assurance software stack for secure function evaluation (SFE). Our stack consists of three components: i.a verified compiler (CircGen) that translates C programs into Boolean circuits; ii. a verified implementation of Yao's SFE protocol based on garbled circuits and oblivious transfer; and iii. transparent application integration and communications via FRESCO, an open-source framework for secure multiparty computation (MPC). CircGen is a general purpose tool that builds on CompCert, a verified optimizing compiler for C. It can be used in arbitrary Boolean circuit-based cryptography deployments. The security of our SFE protocol implementation is formally verified using EasyCrypt, a tool-assisted framework for building high-confidence cryptographic proofs, and it leverages a new formalization of garbled circuits based on the framework of Bellare, Hoang, and Rogaway (CCS 2012). We conduct a practical evaluation of our approach, and conclude that it is competitive with state-of-the-art (unverified) approaches. Our work provides concrete evidence of the feasibility of building efficient, verified, implementations of higher-level cryptographic systems. All our development is publicly available.

Abstract

Abstract
Critical human-machine interfaces are present in many systems including avionics systems and medical devices. Use error is a concern in these systems both in terms of hardware panels and input devices, and the software that drives the interfaces. Guaranteeing safe usability, in terms of buttons, knobs and displays is now a key element in the overall safety of the system. New integrated development environments (IDEs) based on formal methods technologies have been developed by the research community to support the design and analysis of high-confidence human-machine interfaces. To date, little work has focused on the comparison of these particular types of formal IDEs. This paper compares and evaluates two state-of-the-art toolkits: CIRCUS, a model-based development and analysis tool based on Petri net extensions, and PVSio-web, a prototyping toolkit based on the PVS theorem proving system.

Abstract
Formal methods technologies have the potential to verify the usability and safety of user interface (UI) software design in medical devices, enabling significant reductions in use errors and consequential safety incidents with such devices. This however depends on comprehensive and verifiable safety requirements to leverage these techniques for detecting and preventing flaws in UI software that can induce use errors. This paper presents a hazard analysis method that extends Leveson’s System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) with a comprehensive set of causal factor categories, so as to provide developers with clear guidelines for systematic identification of use-related hazards associated with medical devices, their causes embedded in UI software design, and safety requirements for mitigating such hazards. The method is evaluated with a case study on the Gantry-2 radiation therapy system, which demonstrates that (1) as compared to standard STPA, our method allowed us to identify more UI software design issues likely to cause use-related hazards; and (2) the identified UI software design issues facilitated the definition of precise, verifiable safety requirements for UI software, which could be readily formalized in verification tools such as Prototype Verification System (PVS). © Springer International Publishing AG (outside the US) 2017.

Abstract
One way of contributing to a demonstration that a medical device is acceptably safe is to show that the device satisfies a set of requirements known to mitigate hazards. This paper describes experience using formal techniques to model an IV infusion device and to prove that the modelled device captures a set of requirements. The requirements chosen for the study are based on a draft proposal developed by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA). A major contributor to device related errors are (user) interaction errors. For this reason the chosen models and requirements focus on user interface related issues.