Abstract
This paper provides an overview on recent work on Team Automata, whereby a network of automata interacts by synchronising actions from multiple senders and receivers. We further revisit this notion of synchronisation in other well known concurrency models, such as Reo, BIP, Choreography Automata, and Multiparty Session Types. We address realisability of Team Automata, i.e., how to infer a network of interacting automata from a global specification, taking into account that this realisation should satisfy exactly the same properties as the global specification. In this analysis we propose a set of interesting directions of challenges and future work in the context of Team Automata or similar concurrency models.

Abstract
We consider global models of communicating agents specified as transition systems labelled by interactions in which multiple senders and receivers can participate. A realisation of such a model is a set of local transition systems—one per agent—which are executed concurrently using synchronous communication. Our core challenge is how to check whether a global model is realisable and, if it is, how to synthesise a realisation. We identify and compare two variants to realise global interaction models, both relying on bisimulation equivalence. Then we investigate, for both variants, realisability conditions to be checked on global models. We propose a synthesis method for the construction of realisations by grouping locally indistinguishable states. The paper is accompanied by a tool that implements realisability checks and synthesises realisations.

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Abstract
Manufacturers of automated systems and their components have been allocating an enormous amount of time and effort in R&D activities, which led to the availability of prototypes demonstrating new capabilities as well as the introduction of such systems to the market within different domains. Manufacturers need to make sure that the systems function in the intended way and according to specifications. This is not a trivial task as system complexity rises dramatically the more integrated and interconnected these systems become with the addition of automated functionality and features to them. This effort translates into an overhead on the V&V (verification and validation) process making it time-consuming and costly. In this paper, we present VALU3S, an ECSEL JU (joint undertaking) project that aims to evaluate the state-of-the-art V&V methods and tools, and design a multi-domain framework to create a clear structure around the components and elements needed to conduct the V&V process. The main expected benefit of the framework is to reduce time and cost needed to verify and validate automated systems with respect to safety, cyber-security, and privacy requirements. This is done through identification and classification of evaluation methods, tools, environments and concepts for V&V of automated systems with respect to the mentioned requirements. VALU3S will provide guidelines to the V&V community including engineers and researchers on how the V&V of automated systems could be improved considering the cost, time and effort of conducting V&V processes. To this end, VALU3S brings together a consortium with partners from 10 different countries, amounting to a mix of 25 industrial partners, 6 leading research institutes, and 10 universities to reach the project goal.

Abstract
Background: modern robots employ artificial intelligence algorithms in a broad ange of applications. These robots acquire information about their surroundings and use these highly-specialized algorithms to reason about their next actions. Despite their effectiveness, artificial intelligence algorithms are highly susceptible to adversarial attacks. This work focuses on mitigating attacks aimed at tampering with the communication channel between nodes running micro-ROS, which is an adaptation of the Robot Operating System (ROS) for extremely resource-constrained devices (usually assigned to collect information), and more robust nodes running ROS2, typically in charge of executing computationally costly tasks, like processing artificial intelligence algorithms. Methods: we followed the instructions described in the Data Distribution Service for Extremely Resource Constrained Environments (DDS-XRCE) specification on how to secure the communication between micro-ROS and ROS2 nodes and developed a custom communication transport that combines the application programming interface (API) provided by eProsima and the implementation of the Transport Security Layer version 1.3 (TLS 1.3) protocol developed by wolfSSL. Results: first, we present the first open-source transport layer based on TLS 1.3 to secure the communication between micro-ROS and ROS2 nodes, providing initial benchmarks that measure its temporal overhead. Second, we demystify how the DDS-XRCE and DDS Security specifications interact from a cybersecurity point of view. Conclusions: by providing a custom encrypted transport for micro-ROS and ROS2 applications to communicate, extremely resource-constrained devices can now participate in DDS environments without compromising the security, privacy, and authenticity of their message exchanges with ROS2 nodes. Initial benchmarks show that encrypted single-value messages present around 20% time overhead compared to the default non-encrypted micro-ROS transport. Finally, we presented an analysis of how the DDS-XRCE and DDS Security specifications relate to each other, providing insights not present in the literature that are crucial for further investigating the security characteristics of combining these specifications.