Abstract

Abstract
The increasing penetration of renewable electricity generation is complicating the bidding and estimating processes of electricity prices, partly due to the shift of the overall cost sensitivity from operation (fuel) costs to investment costs. However, cost minimization models for capacity expansion are frequently based on the principle that, for a perfectly adapted system allowing non-served energy, marginal remuneration allows overall operation and investments costs recovery. In addition, these models are usually formulated as finite-horizon problems when they should be theoretically solved for infinite horizons under the assumption of companies' infinite lifespan, but infinite horizon cannot be dealt with mathematical programming since it requires finite sets. Previous approaches have tried to overcome this drawback with finite horizon models that tend asymptotically to the original infinite ones and, in many cases, the investment costs are annualized based on the plants' lifespan, sometimes including a cost residual value. This paper proposes a novel approach with a finite horizon that guarantees the investment costs' recovery. It is also able to obtain the marginal electricity costs of the original infinite horizon model, without the need for residual values or non-served energy. This new approach is especially suited for long-term electricity pricing with investments in renewable assets when non-served demand is banned or when no explicit capacity remuneration mechanisms are considered.

Abstract
This paper presents a conjectured-price-response equilibrium approach for modeling both centralized generation (CG) and behind-the-meter distributed generation (BMDG). A Nash game is set up with two constraints linking the CG and BMDG decisions to satisfy both the electricity demand in an energy market and the firm capacity in a capacity market. CG agents maximize their market profits while BMDG customers minimize their net supply costs, making decisions on their annual capacity investments and hourly productions decisions. Customers' costs account for 1) the energy bought from the grid minus the BMDG energy surpluses sold; 2) the payment of the grid access tariff (power and energy-based terms) and 3) the BMDG capacity investments' costs. The equilibrium conditions enable to represent different degrees of oligopoly using conjectural variations in both the energy and capacity markets. This work proves that such an equilibrium problem can be solved through an equivalent, yet simpler-to-solve, quadratic minimization problem. Some case examples compare the results of the proposed joint energy and capacity equilibrium with those from an energy-only equilibrium. Among other conclusions, these cases show that the proposed equilibrium sends adequate economic signals to the consumers to taper off the total system peak demand, whenever the weight of the power-based term of the access tariff is not extremely high.

Abstract

Abstract
The close interaction between the electricity market and the end-users can assist the demand response (DR) aggregator in handling and managing various uncertain parameters simultaneously to reduce their effect on the aggregator's operation. As the DR aggregator's main responsibility is to aggregate the obtained DR from individual consumers and trade it into the wholesale market. Another responsibility of the aggregator is proposing the DR programs (DRPs) to the end-users. This article proposes a model to handle these uncertainties through the development of a novel hybrid stochastic-robust optimization approach that incorporates the uncertainties around wholesale market prices and the participation rate of consumers. The behavior of the consumers engaging in DRPs is addressed through stochastic programming. Additionally, the volatility of the electricity market prices is modeled through a robust optimization method. Two DRPs are considered in this model to include both time-based and incentive-based DRPs, i.e., time-of-use and incentive-based DR program to study three sectors of consumers, namely industrial, commercial, and residential consumers. An energy storage system is also assumed to be operated by the aggregator to maximize its profit. The proposed mixed-integer linear hybrid stochastic-robust model improves the evaluation of DR aggregator's scheduling for the probable worst-case scenario. Finally, to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach, the model is thoroughly simulated in a real case study.

Abstract
There are significant changes occurring both in the electricity system and the natural gas system. These two energy carries can be combined to form what is known as an energy hub. These energy hubs can play a significant role in the energy system and thus understanding of their optimization, especially their costs, is important. This paper proposes a risk management framework for an energy-hub through the utilization of the information-gap decision theory (IGDT). The uncertainties introduced from the various load profiles, such as the electric and heating loads, are considered in this risk management framework. The modeled energy-hub consists of several distributed generation systems such as a microcombined heat and power (mu CHP), electric heat pump (EHP), electric heater (EH), absorption chiller (AC) and an energy storage system (ESS). A demand response (DR) program is also considered to shift a percentage of electric load away from the peak period to minimize the operational cost of the hub. A feasible test system is also applied to demonstrate the proposed model's effectiveness.