2026
Autores
Koprinska, I; Mendes-Moreira, J; Branco, P;
Publicação
Communications in Computer and Information Science
Abstract
2026
Autores
Koprinska, I; Mendes-Moreira, J; Branco, P;
Publicação
Communications in Computer and Information Science
Abstract
2026
Autores
Koprinska, I; Mendes-Moreira, J; Branco, P;
Publicação
Communications in Computer and Information Science
Abstract
2026
Autores
Koprinska, I; Mendes-Moreira, J; Branco, P;
Publicação
Communications in Computer and Information Science
Abstract
2026
Autores
da Costa, RC; Fernandes, MCRM; Roque, LAC; Paiva, LT; Fontes, DBMM; Fontes, FACC;
Publicação
OPTIMIZATION LETTERS
Abstract
This work addresses the joint challenges of layout design and power output smoothing in Airborne Wind Energy farms. The problem is deciding the power units' location and their synchronization, as well as balancing the power output in Airborne Wind Energy Farms, while maximizing the average power output. Airborne Wind Energy systems, particularly the ground-generation type, are susceptible to significant power output fluctuations, which must be mitigated to ensure a stable power flow injected into the electrical grid. We propose and evaluate various synchronization strategies, along with an innovative retraction method introduced in this work, which eliminates the need for synchronized operational cycles among kites. This approach increases flexibility in production cycle selection, leading to a significantly smoother power output signal.
2026
Autores
Accinelli, E; Afsar, A; Martins, F; Martins, J; Oliveira, BMPM; Pinto, AA; Quintas, L;
Publicação
ECONOMIC MODELLING
Abstract
The notion of Union is strength is essential for preserving public goods and mitigating public bads such as air quality. International environmental agreements serve this role by forming stable coalitions, in which agents join or leave based on free-riding incentives. Building on the Baliga-Maskin model, we show that such coalitions can emerge from a simple Markov chain mechanism where agents enter or exit through utility-based bargaining. However, stable coalition formation is challenging, as members may receive substantially lower utility than free-riders. This asymmetry gives rise to Barrett's paradox of cooperation: even with large coalitions and strong preferences among free-riders, overall utility may remain far below that of the grand coalition. Encouragingly, the paradox of cooperation can be resolved when free-riders have sufficiently low preferences.
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